The Neon Green Thong

When I said that my Maintenance Test Pilot was standing around in Iraq in a Kevlar, body armor, boots and a neon green thong, I was not kidding. Much like discovering a laser ranger finder designator in a 20’ MILVAN in my motorpool, I cannot make this sh*t up.

We were walking back from the flight line. Dawn was breaking, allowing shimmering morning light to slowly creep across the sh*thole we called FOB MacKenzie. The scents of the burn pit and the blackwater pond behind the oft-broken shower trailer wafted delicately through the air. In the morning haze, our 1SG was arriving in our trusty 5-ton with a homemade breakfast of rubbery powdered eggs, Grade-E meaty sausage patties, instant grits, and a gluey concoction that was either cement aggregate or oatmeal. We were lucky to have such a delicious fare prepared for us by men who’d probably been on patrol a few hours prior in Ad Daluyiah. It was one of those rare mornings when we’d been stuck out in Ba’qubah all night because of a massive fog bank that had rapidly descended upon Diyala before we could make the run for the drier Salah ad Din province area. We were groggy. We were eager for breakfast and bed. We were not expecting to see the maintenance test pilot, taking in the majesty of the rising sun over Iraq, while enjoying a morning smoke and cup of coffee. As the threat of indirect fires was always present, he was appropriately dressed in his Kevlar, body armor, and boots.

And a neon green thong.

Only the thong.

Warrant officers.

*le sigh*

Well, at least he was wearing his Kevlar and body armor.

Counterinsurgency, you heartless b*tch!

Bill Ardolino, of Long War Journal fame, said it best. “COIN is dead. Long live COIN?”

Oh, COIN, you heartless b*tch!

Oh, sweet Counterinsurgency, why have you been ruffling so many feathers in the milblogosphere? Is it because it’s a buzz phrase, with your COINtras and COINdinistas, that captures our imagination with ideas skimpy offensive operations that can successfully convert a world at “small war” into a world at “large peace,” unlike the overly muscled and massive strategies we saw during the Cold War? Is it because we always knew the drawdown would come, looming on the horizon, waiting to slam our fingers in the proverbial cookie jar of GWOT-funding? Is it GEN Petraeus and GEN McChrystal, with their sexy celeb-general atmosphere who toss that word out like it’s a 4-star challenge coin wrapped in a free yellow reflective safety belt?

Oh, my darling Counterinsurgency, you might just be a tease in a cheap cocktail dress hoisting a field manual program directive at us conventional force-types about the impending rewrite of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and trying to get us to buy into your sexy prose and controversial topics, that only the very cultured of the Army masses can discuss without looking like complete idiots. Thank you very much for reminding me that I am not Crispin Burke, who's pretty damn smart for a Whackhawk pilot.

But wait! I’m an aviator, dearest Counterinsurgency, you can’t phase me with your barroom tricks and flashy lexicon. I was raised in the old Fort Rucker Dawn Patrol Lounge on cheap beer, stale cigarette smoke, and stories about Vietnam from old DACs who routinely tried to find new ways to pinch the butts of the waitresses shouldering plates of dry chicken wings and soggy fries.

With the program directive out on the streets for review of what may become the new FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, where does Army Aviation stand in this picture? Do we even have a spot in the picture at all? Are we still a Movement and Maneuver warfighting function, rolling up under the patronage of branches like Infantry and Armor? Do we consider ourselves worthy enough to be in the targeting development process that lends to tactics development?

You’re damn skippy we do. The rest of the Army and Marine Corps feel the same way. Appendix A, Airpower in Counterinsurgency, will become our stamp upon the services. It will be our chance to speak out about how and why COIN is still relevant, even in Army Aviation, and more than just tricked-out verbal chicanery. Right now, if you read that Airpower in COIN appendix, you’ll know who wrote it right away. Yeah, that’s right… sneaky zoomies… that’s who.

So, now what? What has our relationship come to, sweet Counterinsurgency?

Insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). When viewed from the prospective of our cockpit, these are two sides to the same coin, patterned under the broad spectrum of irregular warfare. As a movement and maneuver asset to the ground force commander, the conditions that lead to insurgency within a populace can become moot to us as pilots. This is not because we are not interested or flat-out don’t care about the ground force’s mission, but because the modular structure of today’s deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it difficult to continue that all important process of Air Ground Integration (wow, you must be sick of hearing me harp about that). Manipulation of a weak populace, regime failures, genocidal tendencies within a group, and external interference from some of the more nefarious neighbors and actors within the state can contribute the success or failure of an insurgent force. The interaction between United States’ ground forces and the populace trying to improve their situation can waffle between good and bad depending on fragile bonds and trusts that we don’t see from the vantage of our cockpits. Can you blame Army Aviation though? We’re trying as hard as we can, but there is not enough aviation to go around, or pilots to get down at boot level and talk with the ground force commander about the subtle nuances of their area of operations.

Before COIN even starts, regardless of where on the map the fight may be taking place, we’re already at a disadvantage. We’re screwed before we’ve even started. Aces. Insurgent forces have seized and retained initiative as part of their own version of combined arms maneuver. To make matters vastly worse, they have key terrain scoped out as well. This puts aviation at a disadvantage. Vulnerability to small arms fire and cheaply attainable and portable MANPADS becomes more evident when the key terrain hasn’t been secured by friendly ground forces yet. Insurgent forces versed in the creation of a secure operating environment for themselves blend quickly and efficiently with the local populace, making identification of irregular enemy forces nearly impossible from terrain flight altitudes. Even engaging targets that have met the established rules of engagement and gone through the escalation of force process is not enough to defeat an insurgency. In fact, that can run the gambit from beneficial to the host nation populace and friendly ground force commander to down-right detrimental to the mission in the event of CIVCAS, civilian causalities. One bad rocket, one poorly aimed Hellfire, or one accidental bullet from a window-mounted M240B can unhinge months of delicate and calculating efforts for US ground forces.  

So, how can Army Aviation help counterinsurgency to establish military ascendancy and enable stability operations to expand across the area of operations? Victory can only be achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively, or even passively, supporting the insurgency. Is this even possible for pilots to effect?

Prior to deployment, we sit in creaky auditorium chairs and listen to professors and State Department personnel drone about the local populace, the history of the nation, the society’s leadership system, tribal communication, ideologies, the nuances of the conflict, the strengths and weakness in the moral fibers of the insurgency and the host nation. To aircrews, which will rarely interact at ground level with the host nation’s population, this may seem moot. Why would a UH-60M crew chief need to know about the narratives that may resonate within a local tribe or ethnic group? In a training schedule packed with pre-deployment considerations that are vital to the combat aviation brigade (another round of gunnery tables or peeling off a Battalion task force to support a BCT’s JRTC rotation) what is the relevance to the aircrew in knowing the history of the tension between a stable agricultural based tribe and a migrating tribe of herdsmen? Given the fact that most of my brethren within the attack reconnaissance community only claim to need a grid, frequency and call sign to get the job done, that’s a tough question to answer sometimes.  

Think of it this way though: “Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm. With good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact.” That is straight from the current edition of the FM 3-24. Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, shared at the level most likely to be in contact with the insurgency and local populace daily. Aren’t we, the aviation force, every bit as likely to be direct contact with the insurgency on a daily basis?

To COIN is to be doing it for the long haul (I know, that’s what she said…)

I know what you’re thinking. Why can’t we just leave? We’re aviation. Hell, CH-47s self-deploy to the field all the time with coolers and camp chairs and grills all the time!  

COIN is not for the faint of heart or the fickle of countenance. In other words, if you have ever been blamed of having “commitment issues” by a member of the opposite sex (like most Cavalry guys I know, or have loved and left) you may not be ideally suited for aiding the counterinsurgent fight. Insurgencies by their very nature are protracted ordeals that demand all your emotional energy, spare time and money. Even if the local populace prefers the host nation government to the insurgents, they may not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. Sounds oddly like Iraq. And Afghanistan. And Vietnam. And every other insurgency we’ve ever dealt with. The insurgents’ primary beef is usually against their host nation government, not the coalition… at least, not to start with. Never the less, once we are involved and committing support, we are in the relationship for the long haul and that can be crucial to building public faith in that government’s viability. It’s critical that the populace have confidence in the staying power of both the counterinsurgents and their government. That’s why we can’t just dump them once we start getting tired of the relationship, or when a younger, sexier insurgency comes along.

Using the Appropriate Level of Force… or none at all.

Any use of force generates a series of reactions, good or bad. Sometimes a massive effort is needed to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. It’s like beating up the neighborhood bully. Everyone leaves happy, and the other bullies get the idea that maybe they should move it along to someplace else. Extremist insurgent combatants often have to be killed. As my pop is fond of saying, “he was bad; he needed killing.” In any case, counterinsurgents should carefully calculate the type and amount of force to be applied and who does it for any operation. Just because you have a Hellfire available doesn’t mean that you need to use it. 

Consider it this way: An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents. If a guy is straddling the fence between “Rock on with yer badself, America” and “Death to the Infidels,” killing his nephew by accident on the back of a moped because he was carrying a rusty AK-47 may cause the uncle (and his whole extended family that remembers the joyous days when the Russians were trollin’ in Againistan) to lean on the lesser jihad side of the fight.

Learn and Adapt

Every unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Duh. This is like telling someone that they need to learn from their successes and mistakes. And the mistakes of the other guys who were there last year. And the guys here two years before that. And the last conquering heroes from like eleventythousand regimes ago. If you don’t know this by now in your military career, you should probably save yourself the trouble, and leave the Army. You’ll be perfect for Congress though.

Empowering the Lowest Levels—and, BEHOLD, another case for good Air Ground Integration

We all know that “mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions.” Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 told us so. Mission command is ideally suited to COIN operations because it empowers the lowest level of tactical leadership to solve problems with a disciplined and well-educated hand. Remember how I said that a good Battle Captain knows their surroundings just as well as a good ground force commander does? Well, no one has a better grasp of their situation than a junior ground leader. Most good Battle Captains can only hope to get as good as their counterparts in the ground units. Perhaps now would be the ideal time to seek them out and bend their ear about how aviation can help (or at least keep from hindering) their fragile missions during COIN?! Under mission command, they are given access to, or even control of, the resources needed to produce timely intelligence and conduct effective tactical operations. So, if everything is at their disposal, why aren’t we? We are their maneuver asset, or at least that’s what we keep claiming to be. Effective COIN operations are decentralized, and higher commanders push as many capabilities as possible down to their level, which includes Army Aviation.

So what about the Air Mission Commanders and the Pilots in Command with our formations?

Young leaders often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic consequences. Fox News is very fond of telling us that over and over and over and over. Senior leaders can affect that through comprehensive training and clear guidance, even in the COIN fight. When they know that their clear guidance is being followed by their well-trained aircrews, they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. We’ve come full circle, haven’t we? Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires more than just mastering vague and slightly stuffy doctrine. They must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local surroundings, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders’ intent. Ahh, we talked about that earlier… guess we should start paying attention during those ridiculous pre-deployment classes, huh?

The Five Unwritten Laws of Land Warfare

Here’s the thing about going to War: your personal higher deity made the Earth round so that you couldn't see too far down the primrose path known as your command. In other words, some whack things will happen that you will have to deal with that will have no ties to the actual business of closing with and destroying the enemy. You will have at least one incident as a commander where you will stand, slack-jawed in the presence of your unit’s senior NCO, while they either come into your little plywood office and close the door or pull you up alongside a Hesco barrier for that “little talk about SPC Who’sHisNuts.” I wish I could offer advice about it all or prepare you for this but just remember this little adage: 1LT is 2LT, with intent.

1. There is going to be a nasty fight. There may even be tears, snot and/or a trip to the aid station. I can’t tell you why Soldiers will be the best of friends while they are in garrison and immediately hate each other about eight or nine months into the rotation. What makes it more whack is that it will be some small infraction that causes this sudden cleave in friendship. You’ll come to the CP one day, discover that a cold war has erupted between a handful of your soldiers over a half-eaten styrofoam clamshell container of cold DFAC eggs with a side of Poo Fly. All the little machinations of the past few months will probably be saved for one glorious blow-up. Over runny, rubbery, fake eggs. Just remember: everyone else's side of the story is right and, before you even get involved trying to quell the violence, you’re wrong. Just go ahead and start chain smoking right now. It's easier.

2. You can potentially get a strap-hanger soldier or two. They don’t belong to you, but they’re always around, looking a little forlorn and pitiful. I don’t know who those soldiers belong to either, but just make a small effort to look after them. Eventually their unit will rotate home. 

She works at the Toy Box. She's just
paying her way through beauty
school... with your soldier's combat
pay. You're a lucky, lucky commander.

3. It is only acceptable to provide commander’s guidance to another commander’s soldier when there is imminent threat to life, limb, or eyes. This may also apply to the base being overrun by Taliban or if the unrelated soldier is about to be run over by a FLUOR contractor from Sri Lanka who’s never driven a Chevy Tahoe in his life… until that very day. Then, by all means, please speak up and say something. Otherwise, keep your trap shut and come talk to me or Top. We’ll fix it. 

4. One of your soldiers will probably marry a stripper right before you deploy. It will be one of two possibilities:

a. The soldier you most expect

b. The soldier you least expect

Either which way, you’ll probably guess wrong. Enjoy dealing with that, by the way.

5. Embrace this saying: If I hear the words “I’m so bored” again, you’re leaving for the Brigade Staff. In Bagram.

The 10 Commandments for Being an Aviation Battle Captain

Dear Shiny New Aviation Battle Captain,

I know. You’re a little frustrated with the Battalion’s S3 at the moment. I’m assuming that you’re normally the Chemo or a newly minted O-3, fresh from a platoon leader position. You’ve been flying for about ten or eleven months, and you were yanked unceremoniously up to the last bastion of frustration and futility: battalion staff. You were probably just told that you’re going to be the Battle Captain for the deployment, and I know you’re hurt and mad and disillusioned with the leadership.

But don’t fret, my pet. The Doctrinatrix and her faithful band of merry men are here to give you hope. You see, once in a kingdom far, far away, we did our time in the fabled battle desk. We, my two friends and I, commiserated the ills done upon us by cranky S3s, rude and self absorbed LTCs, and feisty company commanders. Over MiRC chat we bonded in a strange friendship that has now resulted in several battle captain commandments. Ten of them, to be precise. 

Here we go…

Commandment 1: Thou shalt know thy turf.

You can try all you want to visualize the terrain sometimes. You can study the maps and the imagery and try to gain a little situational awareness, but there is only one thing that can give you the true picture of the ground out there: flying over it. You have to see the battlespace with your own two eyes. You have to ask for a flight, plop your fanny in the jump seat, put on a headset, and fly the ring routes. Or take a spin around the battlefield with the Old Man. Something. Anything. Go see it. Then, when your attack weapons team calls back regarding a TIC they are working in the Pesh Valley, you’ll have an idea of where they are and what they’re dealing with. Maybe then, you’ll leave them alone while they try to lay savage waste to the enemy in a box canyon.

Commandment 2: Thou shalt know how to diagnose thy battlespace problems without being a bother to everyone else in the battlespace.

You gotta be watching and processing at all times. Tidbits of critical information come across the net constantly, giving you detailed cues to the how to the fight is developing (or, sometimes, not developing). As the manager of information and net traffic, the ability to apply your tidbits at the right time and place will ensure that the people who need support get it at the right time and place. You’ll have the most current view of the battlefield. Then, when it comes time to alert the QRF or launch a MEDEVAC or alert the Old Man, you’ll be able to synchronize that information in such a way that facilitates the mission, but doesn’t over-run it with nitnoid things.

Commandment 3: Thou shalt organize what you know, admit what you don’t know, and then seek the path to enlightenment through good guidance and the commander’s intent.

You, my little starling, don’t have to have all the answers all the time. You have to surround yourself with smart and energetic folks who do, and they will make sure you get the right information at the right time so you can affect the battle in a good way. You know that pesky S-2 shop that sometime wanders far and wide of the aviation daily battle rhythm, forgetting that the information that your attack weapons team needs is not the same as what your ring route requires to circulate the battlefield? Compartmentalize those tidbits and pay attention to the other battle captains and what their S-2 shops are reporting for the ground guys. Make your intel pulls into something that can actually push to the particular mission that is going out today. Your aircrews will thank you for it. PS: You have to know the commander’s intent before you can apply it.

Commandment 4: Thou shalt remember that rank means nothing and skillz (with the trendy z) mean everything.

You might not want to be there, but I can promise you that the NCOs around you REALLY don’t want to be there. There is nothing sexy about routine operations on a FOB in support of an aviation battalion. Nothing at all. Until four MEDEVAC kick off from a massive coordinated attack in the Chark Valley, a rocket attack smacks the airfield, the generator takes a big ol’ dump in the middle of the launch, and the air assault that was supposed to be wrapping up an hour ago requests additional support. THEN it’s not so boring and it gets sexy in a quickness. That’s where committed, trained, and team-oriented TOC staffers shine. You can affect this with your attitude and your commitment to training. Look around your TOC. Who’s the SPC that you can rely on in a pinch to rewire the TOC radios when they short out from a power spike in the middle of the night during a BCT-level air assault with attack aircraft support? Yeah, THAT guy. Foster THAT guy!

Commandment 5: Thou shalt seek little victories now, and take stock for the big victories later.

As soon as your RIP/TOA starts, you need plan for a swift and seamless win. That sets your pace for the rest of the month after RIP. As you get into the groove, your actions encourage your supporting battle NCOs and staff sections in TOC to find their groove. Then, when the really terrible things start happening, you’ve got a groove for the little things already in place. When you can handle yourself with that calm, collected air of a battle captain who really has the TOC and the stress under control, you instill confidence in the ground guys you support and the aircrews you’re preparing to launch. Once those really terrible, stressful days are done, you’ll appreciate the slow days more.

Commandment 6: Thou must always remember that bad things will happen, and you must steel your nerves.

You know how I feel about flight schoolers’ crying. This is a little different. You have to internalize frightening and awful things as a battle captain. People will say nasty things to you, just to get a rise and because they’re having a terrible day. You were the first thing they came in contact with. Aircrews will pitch a holy-hell fit on the radio about something, just because they can. You asked the wrong question on the SATCOM when they were busy listening to the ground force commander. You will experience the absolute powerlessness of watching the worst pitch battles of the Infantry unfold around you on CPOF, sending your aircrews into the line of fire to support them, only to see an Urgent MEDEVAC come across your net moments later. You may lose an aircraft. You may lose two aircraft. The CW2 you flew with, drank beers with, laughed with, and lived with is gone. Take a deep breath, go have a smoke, throw in a dip, steel yourself, and finish the fight. Then go cry when you’re done with your shift. You can call me. I’ll bring you smokes and a near-beer. I don’t mind that kind of crying. We’ve all been there. Any battle captain who tells you that they have never had one of THOSE days is a lying sack of sh*t.

Commandment 7: Thou shalt build the solution for the Old Man, and have it ready before he shows up.

When things goes sideways, the Old Man will show up. Don’t be afraid to have a plan ready to brief him with. He wants you to be the man (or chick) in command of his TOC. That’s why he put you there. He likes it when you take charge. He’s kinky like that. He wants to hear what you’ve noticed between your chatting with other battle captains on the net, those S-2 briefs you’ve been keeping up with, and the ideas you’ve developed about the AO because you’ve been paying attention to everything and storing away those seemingly irrelevant facts in your noodle for a time like this! The Old Man thinks he runs the fight, but it’s actually a farce. It’s your fight. You know it better than anyone because you live it every day. Make a plan to be proud of with the input from the good people around you. This also means you need to know his Commander’s Intent… again. See a pattern here?

Commandment 8: Thou shalt get out of your foxhole and go see someone else’s foxhole. You might even like the view.

Sometimes information doesn’t come to you. You have to go seek it out. If you’re an attack recon guy, you already know that, don’t you? If you’re a lift or assault guy, here’s your lesson: develop the situation rapidly and accurately by scouting for gaps, flanks, critical weapon systems, and key terrain. It’s a fundamental of reconnaissance. Get out of your foxhole, and go talk to the aircrews (especially the scout attack guys). Find out what they need, what they can do, and what they have been seeing. Take the S-2 shop soldiers with you. Learn how the other aircrews see things, and then help them to understand what your inner-visibility limitations are during mission execution. When they understand your limits, and you can see their strengths, you begin to unite the warfighter with the war executer (that’s you, by the way)… and that puts the bad guys on the run!

Commandment 9: Thou shalt stay out of other peoples’ cockpits until it’s your turn to fly.

Allow the aircrews to develop the situation. The last thing they need is you getting into an already space-limited cockpit with them. They are developing the situation by scouting for ENEMY gaps, flanks and weapons so that they can provide follow-on actions in support of the ground force commander. Just because bullets start flying or things start happening, you’re not the one in charge of the flight and the ground mission. The Air Mission Commander and the Ground Force Commander have those dubious distinctions. Be prepared to assist, but stay out of the fight until your presence is requested by the AMC. When you get very smart and savvy on your battle captain job, you’ll know when that time is coming.

Commandment 10: Thou shalt hold this truth always: Little is lovely. Small is beautiful. God (or your own personal Higher Power) is in the details.

For a battle captain, the small details are critical. They are beautiful. Nothing is lovelier to see (or do) than conducting a perfect pre-mission brief and an expert post-mission debrief, with all the needed details for the mission available to the aircrews. It sets everything up for success. It makes you, young battle captain, look flawless.

And just for good measure…

Commandment 11: Thou shalt have an exit strategy and keep it secret.

A good battle captain always retains the freedom to maneuver on the battlefield. You’re a very smart young officer, and I’ll let you figure out the meaning to that one on your own.

Now go forth, and do great things.

Love,

The Doctrinatrix