Counterinsurgency, you heartless b*tch!

Bill Ardolino, of Long War Journal fame, said it best. “COIN is dead. Long live COIN?”

Oh, COIN, you heartless b*tch!

Oh, sweet Counterinsurgency, why have you been ruffling so many feathers in the milblogosphere? Is it because it’s a buzz phrase, with your COINtras and COINdinistas, that captures our imagination with ideas skimpy offensive operations that can successfully convert a world at “small war” into a world at “large peace,” unlike the overly muscled and massive strategies we saw during the Cold War? Is it because we always knew the drawdown would come, looming on the horizon, waiting to slam our fingers in the proverbial cookie jar of GWOT-funding? Is it GEN Petraeus and GEN McChrystal, with their sexy celeb-general atmosphere who toss that word out like it’s a 4-star challenge coin wrapped in a free yellow reflective safety belt?

Oh, my darling Counterinsurgency, you might just be a tease in a cheap cocktail dress hoisting a field manual program directive at us conventional force-types about the impending rewrite of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, and trying to get us to buy into your sexy prose and controversial topics, that only the very cultured of the Army masses can discuss without looking like complete idiots. Thank you very much for reminding me that I am not Crispin Burke, who's pretty damn smart for a Whackhawk pilot.

But wait! I’m an aviator, dearest Counterinsurgency, you can’t phase me with your barroom tricks and flashy lexicon. I was raised in the old Fort Rucker Dawn Patrol Lounge on cheap beer, stale cigarette smoke, and stories about Vietnam from old DACs who routinely tried to find new ways to pinch the butts of the waitresses shouldering plates of dry chicken wings and soggy fries.

With the program directive out on the streets for review of what may become the new FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, where does Army Aviation stand in this picture? Do we even have a spot in the picture at all? Are we still a Movement and Maneuver warfighting function, rolling up under the patronage of branches like Infantry and Armor? Do we consider ourselves worthy enough to be in the targeting development process that lends to tactics development?

You’re damn skippy we do. The rest of the Army and Marine Corps feel the same way. Appendix A, Airpower in Counterinsurgency, will become our stamp upon the services. It will be our chance to speak out about how and why COIN is still relevant, even in Army Aviation, and more than just tricked-out verbal chicanery. Right now, if you read that Airpower in COIN appendix, you’ll know who wrote it right away. Yeah, that’s right… sneaky zoomies… that’s who.

So, now what? What has our relationship come to, sweet Counterinsurgency?

Insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). When viewed from the prospective of our cockpit, these are two sides to the same coin, patterned under the broad spectrum of irregular warfare. As a movement and maneuver asset to the ground force commander, the conditions that lead to insurgency within a populace can become moot to us as pilots. This is not because we are not interested or flat-out don’t care about the ground force’s mission, but because the modular structure of today’s deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it difficult to continue that all important process of Air Ground Integration (wow, you must be sick of hearing me harp about that). Manipulation of a weak populace, regime failures, genocidal tendencies within a group, and external interference from some of the more nefarious neighbors and actors within the state can contribute the success or failure of an insurgent force. The interaction between United States’ ground forces and the populace trying to improve their situation can waffle between good and bad depending on fragile bonds and trusts that we don’t see from the vantage of our cockpits. Can you blame Army Aviation though? We’re trying as hard as we can, but there is not enough aviation to go around, or pilots to get down at boot level and talk with the ground force commander about the subtle nuances of their area of operations.

Before COIN even starts, regardless of where on the map the fight may be taking place, we’re already at a disadvantage. We’re screwed before we’ve even started. Aces. Insurgent forces have seized and retained initiative as part of their own version of combined arms maneuver. To make matters vastly worse, they have key terrain scoped out as well. This puts aviation at a disadvantage. Vulnerability to small arms fire and cheaply attainable and portable MANPADS becomes more evident when the key terrain hasn’t been secured by friendly ground forces yet. Insurgent forces versed in the creation of a secure operating environment for themselves blend quickly and efficiently with the local populace, making identification of irregular enemy forces nearly impossible from terrain flight altitudes. Even engaging targets that have met the established rules of engagement and gone through the escalation of force process is not enough to defeat an insurgency. In fact, that can run the gambit from beneficial to the host nation populace and friendly ground force commander to down-right detrimental to the mission in the event of CIVCAS, civilian causalities. One bad rocket, one poorly aimed Hellfire, or one accidental bullet from a window-mounted M240B can unhinge months of delicate and calculating efforts for US ground forces.  

So, how can Army Aviation help counterinsurgency to establish military ascendancy and enable stability operations to expand across the area of operations? Victory can only be achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively, or even passively, supporting the insurgency. Is this even possible for pilots to effect?

Prior to deployment, we sit in creaky auditorium chairs and listen to professors and State Department personnel drone about the local populace, the history of the nation, the society’s leadership system, tribal communication, ideologies, the nuances of the conflict, the strengths and weakness in the moral fibers of the insurgency and the host nation. To aircrews, which will rarely interact at ground level with the host nation’s population, this may seem moot. Why would a UH-60M crew chief need to know about the narratives that may resonate within a local tribe or ethnic group? In a training schedule packed with pre-deployment considerations that are vital to the combat aviation brigade (another round of gunnery tables or peeling off a Battalion task force to support a BCT’s JRTC rotation) what is the relevance to the aircrew in knowing the history of the tension between a stable agricultural based tribe and a migrating tribe of herdsmen? Given the fact that most of my brethren within the attack reconnaissance community only claim to need a grid, frequency and call sign to get the job done, that’s a tough question to answer sometimes.  

Think of it this way though: “Without good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like blind boxers wasting energy flailing at unseen opponents and perhaps causing unintended harm. With good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact.” That is straight from the current edition of the FM 3-24. Effective operations are shaped by timely, specific, and reliable intelligence, shared at the level most likely to be in contact with the insurgency and local populace daily. Aren’t we, the aviation force, every bit as likely to be direct contact with the insurgency on a daily basis?

To COIN is to be doing it for the long haul (I know, that’s what she said…)

I know what you’re thinking. Why can’t we just leave? We’re aviation. Hell, CH-47s self-deploy to the field all the time with coolers and camp chairs and grills all the time!  

COIN is not for the faint of heart or the fickle of countenance. In other words, if you have ever been blamed of having “commitment issues” by a member of the opposite sex (like most Cavalry guys I know, or have loved and left) you may not be ideally suited for aiding the counterinsurgent fight. Insurgencies by their very nature are protracted ordeals that demand all your emotional energy, spare time and money. Even if the local populace prefers the host nation government to the insurgents, they may not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the counterinsurgents have the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. Sounds oddly like Iraq. And Afghanistan. And Vietnam. And every other insurgency we’ve ever dealt with. The insurgents’ primary beef is usually against their host nation government, not the coalition… at least, not to start with. Never the less, once we are involved and committing support, we are in the relationship for the long haul and that can be crucial to building public faith in that government’s viability. It’s critical that the populace have confidence in the staying power of both the counterinsurgents and their government. That’s why we can’t just dump them once we start getting tired of the relationship, or when a younger, sexier insurgency comes along.

Using the Appropriate Level of Force… or none at all.

Any use of force generates a series of reactions, good or bad. Sometimes a massive effort is needed to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. It’s like beating up the neighborhood bully. Everyone leaves happy, and the other bullies get the idea that maybe they should move it along to someplace else. Extremist insurgent combatants often have to be killed. As my pop is fond of saying, “he was bad; he needed killing.” In any case, counterinsurgents should carefully calculate the type and amount of force to be applied and who does it for any operation. Just because you have a Hellfire available doesn’t mean that you need to use it. 

Consider it this way: An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents. If a guy is straddling the fence between “Rock on with yer badself, America” and “Death to the Infidels,” killing his nephew by accident on the back of a moped because he was carrying a rusty AK-47 may cause the uncle (and his whole extended family that remembers the joyous days when the Russians were trollin’ in Againistan) to lean on the lesser jihad side of the fight.

Learn and Adapt

Every unit needs to be able to make observations, draw and apply lessons, and assess results. Duh. This is like telling someone that they need to learn from their successes and mistakes. And the mistakes of the other guys who were there last year. And the guys here two years before that. And the last conquering heroes from like eleventythousand regimes ago. If you don’t know this by now in your military career, you should probably save yourself the trouble, and leave the Army. You’ll be perfect for Congress though.

Empowering the Lowest Levels—and, BEHOLD, another case for good Air Ground Integration

We all know that “mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions.” Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 told us so. Mission command is ideally suited to COIN operations because it empowers the lowest level of tactical leadership to solve problems with a disciplined and well-educated hand. Remember how I said that a good Battle Captain knows their surroundings just as well as a good ground force commander does? Well, no one has a better grasp of their situation than a junior ground leader. Most good Battle Captains can only hope to get as good as their counterparts in the ground units. Perhaps now would be the ideal time to seek them out and bend their ear about how aviation can help (or at least keep from hindering) their fragile missions during COIN?! Under mission command, they are given access to, or even control of, the resources needed to produce timely intelligence and conduct effective tactical operations. So, if everything is at their disposal, why aren’t we? We are their maneuver asset, or at least that’s what we keep claiming to be. Effective COIN operations are decentralized, and higher commanders push as many capabilities as possible down to their level, which includes Army Aviation.

So what about the Air Mission Commanders and the Pilots in Command with our formations?

Young leaders often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic consequences. Fox News is very fond of telling us that over and over and over and over. Senior leaders can affect that through comprehensive training and clear guidance, even in the COIN fight. When they know that their clear guidance is being followed by their well-trained aircrews, they trust their subordinates to do the right thing. We’ve come full circle, haven’t we? Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires more than just mastering vague and slightly stuffy doctrine. They must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local surroundings, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commanders’ intent. Ahh, we talked about that earlier… guess we should start paying attention during those ridiculous pre-deployment classes, huh?