Doctrine doesn't fix everything.

Doctrine. It is the cause of, and solution to, all of my problems. I write good doctrine, I get praised and the terrorists lose. I write bad doctrine, and the terrorists win. My boss also does that silently-staring-because-I'm-disappointed-in-you thing. That’s actually worse than terrorists winning.

Often times we fall back to criticism of existing documents and doctrine as the reason for why things didn’t quite turn out as we expected. It’s as though we want doctrine to do for us what we refuse to do for ourselves: fill the gaps in knowledge that exist because... well... sometimes there is sh*t we just don't know. Pilots and aviation leaders want a comprehensive checklist solution to certain tactical problems that will be 99% effective in ensuring mission success, a placated ground force commander, joy, happiness, satisfied aircrews, puppies for all good little boys and girls, and a loaf in every oven. Doctrine just doesn’t work that way. It really doesn’t work that way for aviation.

Take manned- unmanned operations, for instance. The process of mixing unmanned aircraft and manned helicopters in reconnaissance tasks was a heavy topic on the list things to discuss at  the Aviation Synch Conference last week. The real gripes came from staff planners. Staffers rarely find the same level of joy in talking with other staffers that pilots find in talking to each other.  

And unfortunately, that’s the point at which air ground integration (AGI) tends to break down: the staff-to-staff communication.

So, if mission analysis and staff nug work is where AGI starts (in theory)… but it doesn’t (in reality)… then we should all simply give up now and start drinking.

I know. “But, Wings, it’s only noon and you’re flying this afternoon?” Spare me your AR 40-8 quotes, and save them for your APART. I’m an aviation doctrine writer. I have an escape clause in all Army Regulations.

In reality, the work load is double for aviators supporting ground forces in a COIN environment. Aviation is required to be familiar with their own impact on the ground force’s efforts in the local area of operations. In a COIN fight, we need to step up our game and be familiar with all aspects of the ground force commander’s intent. This is especially so for attack reconnaissance pilots. You have two masters, and you must ensure equal loyalty to both… no matter how much study and leg work you face. Lives and legitimacy depend upon it. It will take away from your time playing Call of Duty while waiting for a QRF launch. Bummer.

So, when the staff fails to truly integrate during mission analysis, it triples the work load of aircrews conducting air ground integration. You are, in a sense, picking up the slack for what your planners failed to provide. 

The majority of AGI breakdowns in planning occur at the brigade and battalion level. And, yet, there are tools a’plenty located at the BCT to facilitate this. The most crucial of these tools? The Brigade Aviation Element. Okay, I admit to being historically snarky against BAEs. On the other hand, some of the best people I know have worked in the element. These are guys who have actively pursued the advancement of aviation’s integration into the planning of all ground missions, especially the ones that would benefit from aerial fires. Not all forces get aviation support. Not all missions need an attack weapons team. Not all patrols get a pair of scouts. Not all named areas of interest get a Shadow loitering overhead. Not all cargo needs to be strapped to the floor of a Chinook. Aviation is not a panacea for every ill on the battlefield, but that should not stop the aviation staff from actively dialoguing with the ground planners. It should not stop the BAE from questioning whether a mission could be made stronger by the application of the right air resources at the right time.

When aviation allows itself to be marginalized at the staff and planning levels, it marginalizes its ability to project combat power. It willingly allows itself to remain as only an enabler, and then starts a self-deprecating cycle of both allowing itself to be shelved as merely “support” and then believing the hype about being shelved for “supporting roles only.” 

The questions every brigade S-3 should ask, whether ground or air, should be:

1. Have I allowed the BAE to become the least common denominator for my aviation planning? Did I bring the myth of “BAE as an extra AMR cell” on to myself? Did I train them? Did I allow them to train themselves? Have I fostered them enough to encourage open and honest review of aviation integration? Or am I using them as extra night battle captains?

2. Have I talked with my counterpart in the air or ground TOC today? Do I know what his commander’s intent is? Have I fostered AGI with my efforts today?

3. Would my TOC drink a couple beers with the other guy’s TOC? Do they think as one team? Or are they divided by the fundamental cry of “us versus them?”

Doctrine can’t solve all problems, but just about every problem a staff might encounter is in doctrine somewhere. It’s just not always Aviation Doctrine.

The trick is not knowing where to look, it’s knowing who to talk with... which typically starts with the staff and a manual that might not always be "aviation."

Carrying a Message to the Senior Airfield Authority

FM 3-04.120, Air Traffic Services Operations, blows. I’m just going to state that right out front. I’m not sure who wrote it, or what their method was, but it left some pretty large gaps in doctrine. Those gaps are now being addressed as we conduct the process of writing mind-numbing mind-altering aviation doctrine. I swear to you that we are trying to fix that problem.

But sobriety keeps getting in the way.

See that over there? That's all the money you
won't be getting for airfield management
training this year. Or ever.

Why is there nothing addressing the critical gap of knowledge about airfield managers (AFM) and senior airfield authorities (SAA) in our current Army doctrine? Why isn’t it all spelled out for us like a checklist in an appendix, where we can gloss over the topic and get back to the business of flying helicopters? It’s a big topic over at the Air Traffic Services Senior Leaders’ Conference this year, being hosted this week by the good folks from the Air Traffic Services Command  (command motto: Bring us your tired, your weary, your wretched masses yearning to have their facility training programs violated by our quality assurance inspection team). ATSCOM has done the best that it can in a rapidly impending atmosphere of budget cuts and doom regarding defense spending. It’s true, we are continuing to dump millions into AH-64D Longbow software updates, as well as the M-model Whackhawk and F-model Chinoodle modifications, but those are the money-maker platforms for aviation right now. Unfortunately, as the aviation budget shrinks, the ATS community will have to do more without resources. Not to mention, all the ATS budget will be sucked up by ATNAVICS radar repairs anyway.

So, where does that leave training dollars for SAA and AFM training? Nonexistent. I’m sorry, but here is the part where I tell you to go put on your big boy or girl panties (or maybe you’re a dude who likes to wear big girl panties, I dunno. Maybe you also fly a Whackhawk?) and drive on, my friend. If you’re waiting for ATSCOM to produce AFM and SAA training for everyone in every brigade, we should probably address a little something called “expectation management.”

The truth is that ATSCOM has tried to get to the root of the problem with digitally exportable training packages (now available online), mobile training teams that come to your brigade or battalion, and a week-long contingency airfield management workshop that allows you to pet the wild theodolite in its native habitat. In trying to address the gaps in doctrine that discuss the roles and responsibilities for an AFM and SAA, we’ve nested ourselves with existing joint and federal regulations and are expanding on the unique considerations and limitations associated with austere airfields. The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center even joined the fray, uniting all of the branches in one room for a Beyond Thunderdome-style cage match where the victor would receive top billing on the new and improved Airfield Opening multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures guide.

And still, we have a C-17 stuck in the mud on FOB Shank. Not kidding. C-17. In the mud. At Shank airfield in the middle of Logar Province. Nosnatchistan. Aces.

And there is probably some SAA standing on the roof of his TOC, looking out towards the airfield that he is endowed with authority and responsibility for (as per the joint task force commander), and asking himself what he did do deserve this in the first place. I’m sorry, sir. According to regulation, it’s all your fault. It’s a bummer, man. You should probably fire your airfield manager and start chain smoking Marlboros now. Maybe you’ll get lucky, by the time the accident investigation team wraps up their report, a stray enemy mortar will land on your plastic port-a-john, and the airfield will be the least of your concerns. 

Yes, the SAA has been delegated authority and responsibility for this strip of airfield and its associated surfaces and hazards. At the same time, blame should not rest completely on the SAA. ATS company commanders (who typically get the title of AFM thrust upon them), controllers, and pilots share that airspace and that blame. Especially the commanders.

Yesterday, I heard the commander of ATSCOM announce that they were developing a course for would-be ATS company commanders. It would run in conjunction with ATSCOM’s previously developed week-long airfield management work shop. This would give the unfortunate slob who find himself staring down the barrel of an ATS company command, and likely AFM duties, a foundation to be an effective leader to his new-found Minions.

Let’s consider this for a moment.

When a company commander in the Armor is suddenly told that he will have to conduct Infantry operations in the mountains of Againistan, he scratches his head, busts out the old doctrine, has a powwow with his officers and NCOs, and develops a training schedule that will meet the intent for his mission. He’s a captain and commander, and the success of his unit as part of a larger organization depends upon the foundations he puts in place before going to war.

Two other things this week caught my attention, along with COL(P) Macklin’s announcement.

I found a scribble on post-it note from when my boss gave this totally awesome synopsis about the battle of Shiloh. In case you don’t follow military history, it was the 150th anniversary of the battle a couple of weeks ago. He geeks out on history. Yes, I took notes during the lecture. This particular note was significant. He mentioned that, during the early days of the all-volunteer force that would comprise the Army of the Potomac, leaders were learning combat operations as they went. At camps of instruction all across the north, young officers learned how to engage their formations by candle light, and then taught it during daylight to their forces. He called it the greatest “ad hocracy” ever. I agree. Shiloh, in case you fell asleep during American history class, was the first significant victory for the northern Army. I might also add that it was totally done by a volunteer force of citizen soldiers.

The second thing I found was a return of A Message to Garcia to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s reading list. I love this essay because it takes on different meaning as you get older, as your views on the world change with the levels of increased responsibility you face. Message, which has developed a cult-like following around the world, fell away from the reading list for a while and then popped back up recently when GEN Dempsey slotted it in again. Written and initially printed in 1899 in a small publication called The Philistine,  it was the brainchild of Elbert Hubbard. It examines the actions of a young officer named Rowan who is given a specific task, to carry a message on behalf of the President of the United States to the rebel fighter Calixto Garcia in the mountain jungles of Cuba. If you haven’t read it, or you claim that you’ve read it but you really haven’t, you should check it out. It's short. In all truth, Hubbard was a soap seller turned craftsman, integral to the expansion of the arts and crafts movement… which is pretty much what everyone remembers the man for. Pretty chairs. Nice furniture. Bungalow houses.

So, what does the rambling of a teetotaling socialist craftsman and book printer from East Aurora, New York, have to do with the military, aviation, and air traffic control company commanders? Elbert Hubbard, who was coincidently killed when the Lusitania was sunk by a German Unterseeboot in WW1, wrote a theme that resonates for most senior leaders who have high expectations of their junior officers: if I give you a job, go figure it out and do it.

Sometimes you get jobs or missions that you have no prior knowledge of or experience in. That’s pretty much the nature of the game for most air traffic control company commanders. It is up to us to do the job of self-education, followed with the job of training our formation. You don’t need ATSCOM to babysit you through the process. You should feel offended that they even made that assumption about you!

GEN Dempsey charged forward with the program to redefine Army doctrine, leading the charge with a concept that we’ve discussed before: mission command, the decentralization of decision-making to the lowest tactical level that can effectively achieve success for the commander’s mission, in line with the commander’s intent. More importantly, like the message of A Message to Garcia, junior leaders are empowered with the ability to make sound decisions within the commander’s guidance to support the commander’s end state.

The commander’s end state is pretty clear: don’t put a C-17 in the mud at the end of the runway at Shank airfield.

Just like the officers who paved the way before us, the Grants and Shermans of the world, we have an obligation to ourselves and our formations to learn by night the things that we may be required to teach and do by day.

So, forward I go to rewrite FM 3-04.120 into something usable for the warfighters. Hopefully it doesn’t just gather dust on a shelf in a tower facility somewhere when it’s all said and done.

Now, the question is, when this manual is ready for everyone to use and train with, who will help me carry a message to Garcia?

Have guns? Will evac?

ATTENTION IN THE TOC: This is a serious post. If you don’t like serious posts, please check back tomorrow when I will have likely written a blog post about the one time when my maintenance test pilot got in trouble for not wearing his Kevlar and body armor outside the safety of our reinforced hangar in Iraq… and was found the next morning, enjoying a smoke on the hangar’s make shift patio, wearing his Kevlar, body armor, boots… and a neon green thong. Only the thong. Seriously. That’s the cavalry for you though.

Mostly I write aviation doctrine. Mostly.

Mostly I read other branch's doctrine. Mostly.

Mostly I stick to debating Close Air Support versus my beloved Close Combat Attack. Mostly.

As a little background, I’m a scout pilot by trade, a former company commander by the grace of amazing soldiers, a one-time battle captain by sheer coincidence, and a current doctrine writer by happenstance. I’ve done all these things in combat, with the exception of doctrine writing. The forces that got me into these jobs were nothing more than right-place-right-time.

Since I’m not an assault pilot, and I didn’t really learn how to spell Air Assault until I had to help write the book about it (literally), I looked at the MEDEVAC issue from the perspective of a scout pilot. I hate it when people get all up in my cockpit with me. There you are, trying to develop the situation by scouting for gaps, flanks, and enemy weapons systems and you have a Battle Captain b*tchin’ in your ear about SITREP-this and BDA-that. I was hired to the aviation battalion battle captain job after two and half years of company command, and because I wanted to see that other side of the radio for the remaining three months of my Afghanistan rotation.  I have no idea what I was thinking. 

So, what happened with SPC Chazray Clark? I don’t know. I can only speculate that something went wrong regarding the launch authority and the escort requirement. According to some reports, the launch was delayed because there were no AH-64 Apache aircraft to escort the unarmed MEDEVAC aircraft to the point-of-injury as per the risk mitigation requirements for a pick up zone where enemy contact was likely. Given the nature of the risk of enemy engagements on the HLZ, you need that coverage sometimes. Even two M240B-armed UH-60s need an escort sometimes, especially when going to locations on the battlefield with a high likelihood of enemy contact. Reporter Michael Yon has ferociously championed the fight to remove the red cross from our MEDEVAC HH-60s and arm them, much in the manner of the Air Force’s combat search and rescue teams, known as Pedro. I don’t know if it will solve the problem. But I’m not a Whackhawk pilot, so I can’t cogitate on the airframe changes or weight restriction or space in the crew area. I do know that there would be some serious lag time between getting that approval to remove the cross and add the guns though, between air worthiness certificates and crew training. I tend to think that part of the problem can be solved by examining the criteria we use to examine and mitigate risk for launch. We have to ask ourselves whether or not we want to solve an aviation problem in five years, in this case once the debate on removing red crosses and replacing them with M240B door guns and gunners is completely done, or solve the issue tonight by realigning the way we fight.

So I’m throwing down the gauntlet and staking a claim in the fight. I think my beloved Battle Captain Mafia (BCM) should embrace this mission to shave those minutes off ourselves!

One of the best methods of solving the problem is addressing the warfighters directly, the crews and battle captains in the aviation force that handle the mission daily downrange. In embracing the difficulties and making honest small strides toward streamlining the launch process, we ensure the crews we send have the most accurate information and best coverage. With this, we can knock precious minutes off our clock, saving lives, limbs and eye sight. BOOYAH! When examining the issue from the platform of an aviation task force battle captain, the small fixes that can streamline the process become things that a unit can quickly add to its battle drills and daily battle rhythm.

What is the mythical “Golden Hour,” when does it start, and why is it even important to an aviation battle captain?

A battle captain is the manager of resources, of which time, people and equipment are categories. In understanding the start and stop point of the Golden Hour for MEDEVAC, we can examine the way that we efficiently prepare and launch our assets. As aviation is a limited resource on the battlefield, careful monitoring will ensure that the right resource goes to the right place at the right time, like MEDEVAC.

In this, we have to understand the “Golden Hour.”

First of all, it’s not in Doctrine. Anywhere. At all. It’s an informal concept that has taken root in the collective conscious of the Army and bloomed. Because it is not doctrinal, and the medical proponency has not blessed off on it, do yourself a favor and throw it away… especially if you’re an aviation battalion S3, battle captain, or air mission commander.

It does brief well though. Sixty minutes to ensure that an Urgent or Urgent Surgical patient is transported from the point of injury to a trauma center that can provide lifesaving procedures, typically a Level II or III Trauma facility. In fact, this is a common practice in the civilian aviation medical evacuation community: a strict adherence to time limits and time lines that ensure the timely transport of critically injured or ill patients to the resource best suited to care for them. It was studied by the medical proponency as a way to expedite the transport of urgent patients to. This is a good thing. Due to the application of strict time constraints on the transport of patients, survivability rates have increased. In the interest of being transparent, there is debate about the inflation of rates or the truth behind what air transport has accomplished in reality, but one cannot debate the importance of what air MEDEVAC crews have managed to accomplish to date!

Aerial MEDEVAC begins in a completely different place from where you would typically imagine: the senior medical advisor to the commander. In the case of Afghanistan, this is at CJTF. In order to preserve the medical evacuation assets, which are owned by the Army’s Medical Service branch, the employment of an air or ground evacuation asset to a MEDEVAC rests with the senior medical advisor. They are best suited to know the nature of the injury, the type of support and equipment needed during transport, and how long the injury has before it worsens. These are medical considerations that drive the selection of either air or ground methods to remove an injured soldier from the field of battle.

In other words, the choice to use a helicopter to accomplish a specific mission is a doctor’s choice. From that point, the 9-line is given to an aviation force to the fill requirement.

From that moment, when the approval message is received by the supporting aviation force, the clock starts ticking to fill the order. The current standard for notification, approval, and launch of MEDEVAC aircrews (and their escorts) is 15 minutes. This is all delegated and tracked digitally by the way, so it’s all broadcasting in real-time in everyone’s TOC. Because this whole process has been made digital through the convenience of modern things like mIRC and CPOF (or CPORN, command post of right now, if you’re so inclined and slightly cav-ish), we all share the same situation understanding across the TOCs. Whether you’re the IBCT Battle Captain or the CAB Battle Captain or the aviation battalion task force battle captain, everyone knows when the clock starts because we all see it in the chat windows. So, long before approvals are granted or leadership is being hunted down for launch authorization, the digital spider web of the BCM is hard at work getting crews spun up and coordinating for escort assets, if they were needed.

Launch Approval versus Mission Approval

The approval to launch an air asset rests with the senior aviation commander based on the level of aviation related risk. This is critical to highlight: mission approval authority and launch approval authority is not the same person. They don’t even have the same background. The ability to launch an aviation asset for an assignment has several critical considerations, which may be enemy threat, rules of engagement, weather, fighter management, escort requirements, and the overall tactical situation. These are things critical to consider for any aviation mission, let alone the launch of a MEDEVAC aircraft. Because these considerations cross the spectrum of aviation risk, the choice to launch the asset is given to the aviation commander, who understands these factors intrinsically. Furthermore, the staff of the aviation task force will have the optimum planning tools available to both identify and mitigate those aviation specific risks, which can include Air Force weather observation teams, aviation specific intelligence tracking and development, flight mission planning tools and software, and armed escort aircraft.

So, as the mission approval authority has the decision to use an air medical evacuation asset, the launch approval authority has the decision of whether it is safe and proper to launch the air asset. In sharing these decisions, the asset is both guarded and protected for use at the right time and place without risking the crew or loss of the airframe.

An Aviation Battle Captain’s Approach to MEDEVAC and Managing Assets throughout the Mission Period

In Afghanistan, aviation battle captains have a plethora of digital assets at their disposal to monitor the process of announcing and commencing the process of air MEDEVAC. Digital battle nets enable immediate posting, transmission, and acknowledgement of missions. This is followed up with standardized reporting to know when a launch has been approved, executed, arrived at the point of pick up, departed the point of pick up and arrived to their destination treatment facility. These digital announcements are critical to situational awareness for both aviation leadership and ground forces, anxious to know the status of their in-bound medical asset.

Part of being a battle captain is knowing how to manage resources in the immediate fight. While future operations and current operations fall under the purview of the S3 in total, and there is a high degree of interaction between these two cells within one shop, the there is a distinct difference between them. One plans for the future. One plans for the next couple of hours. So, how can the battle captain plan for MEDEVAC readiness when the fight varies? If I could offer the aviation BCM some nuggets, it would be this:

Preparing for the worst: Getting yourself postured as a battle captain to do MEDEVAC

                1. Examination of the ground force CONOPS daily. As the links between fellow battle captains cross unit boundaries in the digital world, frequent contact with the battle captains in the BCT and battalion tactical operations centers offers insight into the missions currently underway and those planned for the future. This information, when synthesized properly, becomes a window into knowing which patrols or missions are likely in end up in contact with enemy forces and lead to the launch of a MEDEVAC (or even a quick reaction force of attack reconnaissance aircraft), especially when paired with the constant stream of intelligence from an aggressive and proactive S2.

2. “Watching” the fight; “Knowing” the critical points. During the course of a deployment, as familiarization grows with both an area of operations and the coalition ground forces, critical points in a mission will unfold on the digital network to the people who pay attention to them. This is best accomplished at times by simply opening the right windows on military internet relay chat (mIRC), Command Post of the Future (CPOF) or even Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and watching. The key is to know what windows to open, who to talk with, and what to look for. In planning the day’s operations, review of CONOPs and discussion with the future operations cell will gives perspective on who should be chatted up digitally on the mIRC net. The first place the digital transmission of the 9-Line will be seen prior to the division or CJTF mission approval authority will likely be in the mIRC window of the battalion in contact. This garners a battle captain the ability to alert crews, gather critical information (such as weather or threat situation), posture attack aircraft as escorts, and start planning for launch authority notification, if needed. Once the rose is pinned to the unit to launch, the battle captain will already have the crews briefed and on their way to the aircraft. This saves valuable minutes in the launch process and provides time to react to changes. It is vastly easier to turn an asset off than it is to turn it on.

3. Alerting the Boss. There are times when the risk associated with launching an asset will exceed the approval authority of the aviation battle captain, and the leadership will need to be notified for approval. By watching chatter on nets and monitoring the fight as it develops, a battle captain can posture themselves to know how to quickly reach out to the right launch approval authority at the right time. This saves valuable time in the debate of knowing what risks may be associated with sending an asset into an area, especially considering the threat situation. This enables the commander to have the critical situational understanding he or she needs to put the right assets on the job. This also limits stalls in response time due escort requirements, premature launches, and “territorial” debates about missions. The more information that a battle captain can give to both the ground and air commander will ensure that tactical trust is present. When there is tactical trust in the ability of an aviation battle captain, the commander will also trust their judgment and suggested solutions to problems during the launch sequence.

4. Communicating with the Flight before the Flight happens. Prior planning prevents piss poor performance. Daily mission briefs need to be made available and given to any and all aircrews that are preparing to fill mission sets for the day: attack reconnaissance pilots (which includes unmanned aircraft systems crews), ring route or air movement crews, and the MEDEVAC teams on call. Every aircrew needs to know what a battle captain  has been watching and discussing with the ground forces via the digital networks, and any additional information that a battle captain can give quick reaction force personnel helps them to stage themselves in a position to launch or dynamically retask to assist ground forces. The link between the MEDEVAC crew on shift and their escort needs to be made in order to ensure that battle drills, limitations and considerations are shared.

                5. Dealing with the launch restrictions. Inevitably there are limitations to the use and application of any air assets on the battlefield. Air ambulances are no different in this matter. Between an aviation commander’s years of experience and intuition and the planning conducted by his or her staff, limitations are balanced with the need to safely meet mission. Restrictions aren’t bad unless they aren’t reexamined for poignancy every now and then. As a battlefield changes during the course of a deployment, and the need for security increases or decreases. Consequently, the needs of the unarmed air ambulance to have a standard UH-60 chase aircraft or attack escort for launch will also change. As an example, if an AH-64 is necessitated to escort an air ambulance to a point-of-injury pick up, units will determine whether weapon sight systems for the attack escort must be completely optimized prior to departure from the FOB or allow for optimization in flight. This is a trade-off for the commander. Does he allow for immediate take-off and system optimization in flight, risking the inability of the attack escort to provide immediate suppression of enemy fire once the berm is crossed? Or does he wait for optimization, allowing precious minutes to tick by on a soldier’s life? These are difficult considerations that are managed by frequent and careful examination of both the risks and the mitigation measures in place.

                6. How to instruct the ground force on using their asset. Whether serving a ground force commander in a direct support or general support relationship, air ground integration goes beyond just sharing the ground force scheme of maneuver or the effects of the AGM-114R from an AH-64D. The ability of a battle captain to articulate limitations to the ground force staff about air MEDEVAC is every bit as critical as discussing weapons effects. Much of this is air ground integrations is accomplished through a competent and proactive brigade aviation element prior to leaving the home station. Even with comprehensive air ground integration, the highly charged and emotional atmosphere of an urgently needed MEDEVAC can cause rifts in the shared understanding that ground and aviation units have. Having a well thought and well crafted plan ready for the ground force commander is every bit as vital as having one ready for the aviation commander. This is where a battle captain can preserve an asset from being misused prior to it even being needed or requested.

SPC Clark was a tragic loss. I don’t know what happened. I can’t help but wonder that, if he’d been injured during my watch as a battle captain, maybe things might have been different. I wonder if I would have planned my asset allocation differently . I wonder if I would have recognized a fight brewing, posturing both MEDEVAC and escort assets in a better fashion. I wonder if I would have had a better solution to the delays for my commander.

Mostly I just wonder. Mostly.

Engaged?

The most difficult task any planning staff in an aviation task force can do right now is engagement area development. Honestly. It is. I dare you to walk up to any new pilot on Mother Rucker and ask them about EA development, and they would give you the same blank stare that they typically reserve for an instructor pilot who asks them about the requirements to enter Class B airspace. There might even be a ribbon of drool coming from their mouth after a second or two. It's not their fault though. This is part of the insidious nature of the quick reaction force mentality of today’s attack reconnaissance aviation. Engagement area development has little to no place in the QRF world of gimme-grid-freq-call-sign-and-we’ll-figure-it-out-enroute because it requires more than just using what you have on the rail to achieve an effect that you may not be totally sure of. There is little planning in QRF planning. Let’s be honest. It requires highly adaptive and responsive leaders who have a high level of shared situational understanding with the ground force commander to really get any semblance of mission success… without causing unforeseen area of operations lunacy later.

First of all, what is an engagement area, and how does one develop it?

An engagement area is an area in which the commander intends to contain and destroy an enemy force with the massed fires of all available weapons. The size and shape of the engagement area is determined by the relatively unobstructed visibility from the weapon systems in their firing positions and the maximum range of those weapons. Sectors of fire are usually assigned to subordinates to prevent fratricide. An EA should have four things:

1.) multiple battle positions from which to attack

2.) obstacles to channel the enemy and permit use of direct and indirect fires

3.) standoff from the enemy, to minimize enemy counter fire while maximizing the friendly probabilities of kill

4.) continuous visibility of the targets

The two most significant things to me would be items 3 and 4, and I’ll tell you why. It focuses the planning staff and the training of young pilots in the formation. But more on that in a second.

This has practical application in many different facets of everyday life. Have you ever gone genocidal on a hill of fire ants with a big stick and a can of Raid? Yeah, THAT is EA planning and execution. You massed all available weapon systems to achieve the desired effect, minimizing your own exposure to counterattack through standoff and a fire distribution plan. Look at you… all tactical. That's hot. 

EA development is simple when you know what it is, but the subtle nuances can lead unforeseen difficulties. Let’s go back to items and 3 and 4 now.

Number 3 is simple. If you don’t know what a system looks like on the sensor you’re  using, how can you engage it?

I have to know how to find and kill what the ground force commander wants dead. This means two things: I have to know how to use the systems on the aircraft to fix the enemies disposition and then I have to know what effect I want to have on the enemy, based on what the ground force commander really wants.

Item 4 is a little tougher. There is a subtle difference “dead,” you know.

In order to achieve “a high probability of kill,” I have to know what kind of kill the ground commander wants. Does he want a mobility kill? What about a personnel kill? A firepower kill? Or does he want a total kill… the infamous K-KILL? All of these have different requirements for individual weapons and targets. While one AGM-114P+ (our UAS brethren’s missile of choice) can be enough for a sedan full of Haqqani fighters, one AGM-114R (your standard HF radar missile) is not going to  even make a dent in a reactive-armored T-72 main battle tank, the preferred tank of all good communist oppressors and soviet-backed warlords the world over.

In short, one Hellfire missile does not equal one dead tank. 

Despite the increase in knowledge on the part of our ground forces on what varying weapons may be hanging from the racks of an AH-64D, this hasn’t gotten us back to positive effects based planning. We, as aviation specialists, have to ask the right questions. “What effect do you need?” Not “what weapon do you want.”

So, this is important to note because the ignorance of real weapon effects is an epidemic across the Army today. This is because we neither understand how to predict them, nor how to train for them. We’re still focused on the need for grid-freq-call sign-use-what-you-got. In the effort to return the Army to standards and effective training for the next war, we have an obligation to young pilots to foster tactical curiosity about the enemy they will face in the future.

At some point, we will hand the young LTs and WO1s a can of Raid and a stick, pointing them in the direction of a former soviet-funded nanny state to do their worst. We should probably engage that issue now. 

Field San(-ity)

So, as you know, we are rewriting aviation’s doctrine up here in the Penthouse. Part of sorting and rewriting manuals is figuring out what is really critical to retain and what you might be able to delete. It’s like cleaning out the fridge, but without finding something moldy in the back that growls at you when you pick it up. During this process, we have all really come to enjoy evaluating the things that are important when conducting operations, like movement to contact, and the things that are REALLY important to conducting operations, like field sanitation.  

And, really, there is only one part of field sanitation that anyone in the field truly cares about.

I couldn’t hold this back from the field any longer. Technically you cannot conduct planning and operations using draft doctrine or publications. It all has to be provided to the field (in Big Reveal style) by the Army Publishing Directorate. Consider this critical piece of technique (which is a method that is non-prescriptive in nature, as defined by JP 1-0)… like a “best practice,” as my boss is so fond of saying.

Actually, this was inspired by that same boss. He’s pretty smart, that boss of mine.

Take a good, long look, kiddies. This is what happens on a Friday in TRADOC.
We have cocktails... and write doctrine.
Don't say that "it will never happen" to you...





If you like this, then you'll love the rest of the chapter and the manual that covers it for Army Aviation: ATP 3-04.15, Aviation Sustainment. 

Helicopters in COIN: Quality versus Quantity



MAJ Crispin Burke.
He wants YOU to help rewrite the COIN manual.

Carl Prine penned a missive called A Strategy for the Birds back in November of 2011, and it’s been stuck in my craw ever since. It also got me involved (albeit, inadvertently) with the counterinsurgency crowd, even though I have my doubts about aviation’s positive impacts on COIN, especially in Afghanistan. But, whatevs. Strategy is not my bag. I leave that up to much smarter men than I.

Aviation tactics and techniques? Now those are my bag.

There is no doubt that helicopters are a critical tool for the ground force commander. This is doubly so in a nation where vast stretches of land have little or no infrastructure to aid in the penetration of what would typically be seen as insurmountable terrain. Afghanistan needs helicopter support to advance the efforts of ground tactical commanders in securing both physical and human terrain in the fight against Taliban insurgency.

Unfortunately, it’s not a panacea like some might have you believe.  Some… like most aviation battalion, squadron and brigade commanders. Now I love me some CAB and BN task force commanders, don’t get me wrong. My heart is wedded to the idea that commanders must advance the efforts of their formations, especially when that formation is part of the Movement and Maneuver Warfighting Function.

But when it comes to the assessment of our effects on battlefield, ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, should have us taking a step back and considering how we, in aviation, measure our effects when it comes to nesting our aviation tactics with the national strategy of winning a nearly unwinnable conflict.

I know. I knoooooow. Today, as I write doctrine, I feel impotent and not important. But my goal is to get planning staffs to make their assessments of their success more important… and less impotent.

Flaccid?

Flat?

Yeah. Flat. Sounds less smutty that way. 

So, anyway, back to the aviation doctrine stuff.

The American military loves technology. The way the ground force commanders fetishize (great word, Carl) aviation technology is unparalleled in today’s fight. Unmanned aircraft, attack helicopters, air assaults… we rely on rotary and fixed wing aircraft to do nearly everything that we once relied on pack animals, 5-tons and tanks to do in previous wars. We use Whackhawks to keep guys off roads that are riddled with ambushes and improvised explosive devices, but why? It comes back to the idea of helicopter-as-tactical-panacea when we should be addressing the strategy of breaking the IED network to make the roads safer for travel and transport. When we fly over the terrain, we miss the fights that we should be getting into: those critical counterinsurgent activities that connect the coalition to the weapon system of choice in a COIN-centric fight, the civilian population.

At best Army Aviation is a pusher to addicts, junkies strung out on the use of rotary wing to accomplish the missions that haven’t been enabled by political and national strategy to accomplish. Strategy has created a dependence on the helicopter, and then hamstrung the ways that we can use it. I’m not talking about the rules of engagement, which already embed multiple (and sometimes unnecessary) control steps in the process of engaging enemy targets during troops-in-contact, but use of modularity: the plug-and-play nature of aviation into the brigade combat team fight.

Yeah, it’s an Air Ground Integration b*tch-fest again.

Carl is right about application of air power as a curative to the ills of a gapping strategy, void of good assessment tools that are both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Since modularity cuts us off from the ground forces that we could organically deploy with, we don’t get the chance to develop the shared understanding of capabilities, limitations, and mission as an air and ground team. We can’t reach the point where our shared understanding of using helicopters transcends the simple application of technology in a fight. This leaves aviation leadership wondering what metrics are critical to assessing their battlefield successes. They ultimately go back to the old reliable ones: number of missions flown, people and cargo transported, air assaults completed, hellfire missiles launched, and bad guys killed.

In ADP 5-0 we see that “effective assessment incorporates both quantitative (observation-based) and qualitative (opinion-based) indicators. Human judgment is integral to the assessment.” It also concludes that “a key aspect of any assessment is the degree to which it relies upon human judgment and the degree which it relies upon direct observation and mathematical rigor.” Rigors offsets bias. Human judgment helps us to reach past mathematics of success and see that intangibles factor in the situation, especially in the highly fluid nature of COIN. There is a balance between quantity and quality of results. This is why Vietnam’s focus on the body counts failed its leadership as a good metric for success. It’s why we should avoid defining our success metrics in aviation by the same measure.

So, back to Carl. Whole fleets today can’t make Karzai’s regime more legitimate or puissant. I agree with that. Don’t you? But I want to take another approach at this statement and thought process. Negativity does not educate. 

Army Aviation cannot legitimize governments. Bombers in WW2 could not legitimize the allied efforts against the nationalist socialist party. Linebacker II was never going to succeed in giving the government in South Vietnam the legitimacy it deserved. Aviation cannot legitimize things. We delegitimize efforts through the failure of development of good success metrics and mission assessment tools that nest with the ground force commander’s intent.

Carl was right. Strategy of the ground force mission isn’t for the Birds after all. But the ground force’s tactics are. Let’s recage our instruments, get back to good air ground integration, and prove him wrong.

Demonstrating Combat Power



See? Doctrine is fun. How else do we learn about
aerial interdiction against sneaky Russians?

Can a working group full of aviation doctrine writers be fun? You might say "no." I say "yes." It's because I find good doctrine sexy. 

Today my boss started off our weekly work group for our new collection of Army Aviation manuals with reading an excerpt from an article regarding the Doctrine 2015 program, which will lead to restructuring Army doctrine into something usable and functional for the warfighter. Since I’ve been living the Doctrine 2015 dream for about six months now, I’m immune to the platitudes of a speech writer’s pandering in articles from Fort Leavenworth, the Intellectual Center of Nowhereinparticular. My boss continued to read a section about Unified Land Operations and ADP 3-0 and something he said caught my attention.

“There is nothing new about the concept of seizing, retaining and exploiting the initiative in order to achieve military goals. It is the essence of what Army leaders do and have done throughout history. We force our adversaries to fight on our terms, at times and places of our choosing, and in ways that place them at the greatest disadvantage. We achieve a superior position through the destruction of enemy forces, capabilities or sources by seizing key terrain, protecting key populations, building partner capacity or through a tailored combination of these.”—LTG David Perkins and CPT Nathan Finney

So, first of all, this is a great selling point for everything I love about attack and reconnaissance: seizing, retaining and exploiting the initiative, forcing our adversaries to fight on our terms, and achieving a superior position through the destruction of enemy forces. Then I got stuck thinking about the phrase “fighting on our terms.”

Here is the problem with that little nugget: when have we, in aviation, ever gotten to choose the terms that we fight with? Sure, the combined arms team can drive the fight with the proper demonstration and application of combat power at the right time and place. But it was the nebulous side of “fighting on our terms” had me wondering… the things we cannot control as pilots.

Try though I may, I cannot control weather. I cannot choose to fight in places where the climate has only reasonably mild temperatures, low density and pressure altitude, sits around sea level, with only favorable winds, and level or open terrain. If that were the case, I would be fighting a war in south eastern Alabama. 

Since you cannot pick the climate and terrain of where the fight will be, you have to know how to demonstrate and apply combat power in a judicious manner in any location. Typically, this location includes, but is not limited to: high temperatures, high pressure altitude, heavy loads of weapons and fuel, and confining terrain. It's not ideal. 

Then there is this thing:

Yeah. I’ll give you a second to recover from that. Oh, and if you cringed when the helicopter hit, you’re not alone. I’m sure the split second when the aircrew realized they were not going to recover this maneuver, just before they pancaked that aircraft, they probably cringed a little too.

If you’re not familiar with what the aircrew was trying to do, it’s called a cyclic climb to a coordinated turn, or a return-to-target. It’s used a method combat maneuvering flight to quickly reengage a target and keep a low profile for returning surface fires. It requires good coordination between cyclic, collective, and antitorque pedals. It requires the aircrew to be cognizant of where the winds are coming from, so they can terminate the maneuver favorably. It also means that they must be aware that, when space for adequate recovery at the end of maneuver is not available, you need power… which isn’t always available in high, hot conditions with restrictive terrain.

The first time I ever saw a RTT was as a young LT in OIF II. I was with an experienced IP who executed the maneuver during an engagement. Everything went perfect. He terminated into the wind, he had protected ample power for the inevitable cushion he’d need at the end, and he kept the aircraft in trim the whole time. When all was said and done, and we were safely flying back to FOB Warhorse for post-mission debrief and cocktails, he asked me if I would “like to learn how to do that.” This is like asking a fat kid if they would like their cake with a side of cake. 

It took ages before I felt comfortable doing them in an environment like Iraq. And by “comfortable,” I mean I wasn’t removing the seat cover from butt at the end of the maneuver. Frankly, I doubt that I would ever be completely comfortable doing them in Afghanistan. I don’t even like making left turns in Iraq or Nosnatchistan in an OH-58D.

We don’t get to delay the fight for favorable conditions. The enemy knows that too. They pick places to fight where aircrews are always at a disadvantage. They love to fight in box canyons in the foothills of the Himalayas. They seem to enjoy operations in urban desert terrain, where lines of inner-visibility are restricted by shacks and crumbling buildings filled with equally freaked out civilians. With restrictions like that, it’s amazing what good pilots have been able to accomplish on behalf of ground forces in past decade.

You don’t get to pick where you fight. You can pick how and where you train for your fight though. No matter what happens, we have an obligation to protect our combat power for later… so we can demonstrate it correctly… by f*ckin’ up some bad guys with our munitions.  

Mission Command and the Air Mission Commander: why air ground integration totally rocks my socks and ADP 6-0 totally validates the close combat attack!



Ground dudes. Pilots. Working together.
In harmony. Playing nicely. What is the
world coming to?
(Camp Taji, Iraq. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Travis Zielinski)

I love the philosophy of mission command. It's sexy. 

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0, page 2)

How can you be a pilot and not find that sexy because that’s totally an introduction to things that are even sexier? Air ground integration things. You know, Army Aviation pitched a fit about how we didn’t have our own warfighting function, which is ridiculous. We are a part of every warfighting function, especially the movement and maneuver function and the mission command function! Even better? The principles and philosophies of mission command, the more esoteric side of leader empowerment, is totally a case for air ground integration.

Which, of course, totally begets the close combat attack (CCA)! But more on that in just a second.

So, examining the principles of mission command. Let’s take a peek, shall we?

1. Build cohesive teams through mutual trust. That’s tactical trust, people. We’ve discussed that puppy before. Tactical trust, the ability of a commander to intrinsically know that their junior leadership is executing the mission in accordance with their desired intent and end state, is critical to doing combined arms operations. As aircrews, our segregation from the ground force commander by virtue of modularity means that we have to work even harder to inspire trust in the ground force commander. We have to make the effort to nest ourselves, our plans and our effects, with what the ground force commander needs. Integrate early, integrate often, I always say. Then again, I’ve also been known to say drink vodka early, drink vodka often… take my advice for what it’s worth, and only when I’m sober.

2. Create a shared understanding. This is situational understanding (or situational awareness, if you haven’t gotten that memo yet). Situational understanding has to be a shared idea and picture of the battlefield, or your missions will never nest quite right with the ground force’s missions. You have to see what they see, know what they know, and speak the same intent and end state. Since aviation can’t hold and clear ground, the mission we embrace and share must be with the ground forces. Every piece of information or bit of intelligence we garner must be for them, with them in mind always! It’s very codependent, but not in that creepy drunk-ex-girlfield-beating-on-your-front-door-at-2am-on-a-Wednesday-night kind of way.

3. Provide a clear commander’s intent. This is kinda sorta obvious because mission command’s definition of “enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent” tells us that the commander’s intent is really driving the train for this one. If you are a commander, hoping that you can embrace a little shared tactical trust with your subordinates, you have to have a good commander’s intent for them to work with. One that is clear, concise, and decisive in nature will inspire a feeling of trust within your subordinates… who, in turn, will operate within your intent to meet your end state, which inspires your trust in them. It’s like a tactical group hug (where, after a couple of weeks in the field, all the huggers smell like feet).

4. Exercise disciplined initiative. Initiative is the willingness to act in the absence of orders. There are going to be times when the commander can’t foresee the future events of the enemy or civilian populace, but a response is needed. The foundations of tactical trust, the principles of mission command, gives subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment to the situation, know the intent of their commander, and choose a course of action that will keep the mission moving in a positive direction.  We’re not Russians. We don’t need the commander to provide new orders for everything, especially when you’re growing junior leaders in an environment that fosters discipline, professionalism, and good decision making.

5. Use mission orders. Speaking of issuing new mission orders… mission orders are directives that emphasize which results are to be attained, not how the results are attained. It’s effects based planning. We figure out what the end state should be, based on the shared understanding of our environment, and then we figure out the best method to achieve those effects without going outside of the commander’s intent. This sounds eerily like an introduction to air ground integration, right? We plan for the effect we want, not for the system we want. You might get a ground force commander who thinks he needs eight Chinooks for his company sized air assault, but he really just needs a little interaction with the aircrews to help him figure out what best meets his needs for quickly arriving at the objective to retain surprise and speed of maneuver.

6. Accept prudent risk. This is tougher for leaders working with aircrews. Prudent risk is a deliberate thing that exposes us purposefully to potential injury or loss when the commander believes the mission accomplishment is worth the cost. Opportunity comes with risk. But risk, when properly planned for and mitigated, can lead to tactical rewards, especially when subordinates trust that leadership knows what they are doing. Take Stonewall Jackson for instance. His men cheerfully accepted the process of being maneuvered over long distances, knowing that their leadership was doing so to flank and maneuver to advantageous positions. This meant that, when it came to engage, GEN Jackson’s forces were ideally suited and positioned to win. His subordinates knew that, down to the infantryman level, and trusted the judgment of the leadership. Mucho sexy.

So, how does mission command totally rock my air ground integrated socks and validate the sexiness of CCA? Like this.

Picture the six principles of mission command. Now read this:

“Operations must be integrated so air and ground forces can simultaneously work in the operational environment to achieve a common objective.  Air-Ground Integration (AGI) is a process that allows ground maneuver commanders to maximize combat power by synchronizing the maneuver, fires, and effects of both aviation and ground forces to accomplish a stated mission.  Integrating aviation units into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver increases the capability of the ground maneuver force by drastically improving speed, range, flexibility and lethality, beyond the normal capabilities of a stand-alone ground maneuver unit.” (CW4 Anthony Parrott, USAACE DOTD Gunnery Branch)

Let’s pull this statement apart, shall we?

“Operations must be integrated so air and ground forces can simultaneously work in the operational environment to achieve a common objective” Sounds like building a team through mutual trust and common goal, right?

Or how about this?

“Air-Ground Integration (AGI) is a process that allows ground maneuver commanders to maximize combat power by synchronizing the maneuver, fires, and effects of both aviation and ground forces to accomplish a stated mission.” If that isn’t team building, with a healthy nod to the need for a clearly stated commander’s intent and effects-based planning, I don’t know what is!

Orrrrr, my personal favorite…

“Integrating aviation units into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver increases the capability of the ground maneuver force by drastically improving speed, range, flexibility and lethality, beyond the normal capabilities of a stand-alone ground maneuver unit.” Based on the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver, intent and end state, we combine our initiatives to increase our shared lethality, mitigating the tactical risks of working alone on a highly fluid battlefield!

You can’t help but nod in agreement, right? You’re all, “that’s so right, Doctrinatrix. I totally see what you mean now. I’m going to go read ADP 6-0 and find some hidden meaning right now.”

BUT WAIT there’s more. I know, as if this couldn’t get any sexier than it already is?

Let’s look at our old friend, the close combat attack.

This is usually the point where Whackhawk pilots will mentally check out, and go to their happy place (which is typically filled with manicures and pink mega-girly-drinks). And, yet, I have managed to brainwash the man they call Starbuck to my CCA-is-sexy cause, and he’s a Whackhawk pilot. Soooo, THAT should tell you how important this all is, people…

The close combat attack is both boon and curse to the attack reconnaissance community and the ground forces they support. Enabling the ability for the ground force commander to achieve effects with aerial munitions, the use of the close combat attack tends to be restricted to troops-in-contact scenarios. Where CCA and CAS, close air support, differ is the requirement for terminal control of platform for munitions use and release. But it’s suggestive of the nature of CAS's evil twin (according to the Marine Corps), the CCA. High degrees of mutual situational understanding, shared knowledge of the ground force commander’s intent and missions, and shared tactical risk link air and ground assets in good air ground integration, which means that both have a vested interested in the successful outcome of an engagement. I don’t need a trained babysitter to tell me what headings to turn inbound on, what munition to use, or when to press to the trigger. As an air mission commander, pilot in command, and professional Army aviator, I know what to do because I have hedged my bets favorably through dutiful study and integration with the ground force I support! Mission command begets the sharing of missions, fosters the cooperation of tactical parties, and advances junior leaders to exercise disciplined initiative within their commander’s sound, solid intent. All of this gets us back to ground force commander having tactical trust in the air mission commander to do the right thing because the lives of his soldiers (and civilians in his area of operations) depend upon that!

This is why mission command is really a case for air ground integration and why I think it’s so freakin’ sexy.

Chances are, now you think it’s sexy too!