"It was a dark and stormy night...," or why vignettes can be like herpes in doctrinal manuals?

So like I was telling you last time, I was up at Langley Air Force Base last week (base motto: our Joint Strike Fighters are awesome and are so expensive they must run on pure gottdamm panda blood). I was doing what I do best, writing some seriously heavy stuff. Since the Air Land Sea Application Center is supposed to produce publications that the warfighter can actually use to fight wars (or as toilet paper in a pinch), there was some serious discussion about vignettes.

Vignettes are these awesomesauce little stories in manuals that are suppose to make the material both relevant to the reader and engaging while emphasizing the doctrinal message in the body of the publication. It’s basically a “no sh*t, there I was” story about whatever specific chapter of a manual you’re reading. Frankly, I think they add nothing to an ALSA pub, the place where the venerable and divine JFIRE manual comes from (which would be more divine if they would remove the section on Joint Air Attack Teams because that stuff gets planned at echelons so far above the warfighter’s reality that that particular reality has special parking at the commissary and lives in housing where one rarely finds weeds, rust, or cheap beer in cans).

On the first page of the old 2007 version of the MTTP for Airfield Opening there was a vignette. This immediately became a discussion point for the writing group. The discussion went like this:

“WHAAAAA?”

“This adds nothing to the chapter."

“It adds humor to the chapter."

“No, it adds herpes to the chapter."

“F*ck it. Delete it, dude."

And then we deleted it. Buh-bye, retarded little vignette. Your 15 minutes of fame are now done. Vignettes should add something to the discussion or make you feel like reading more (which is especially important when you need to trick people into reading a particularly boring manual like, say, JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, or the Utility and Cargo manual for the Whackhawk pilots).

But for posterity, I have captured that little deleted nugget of joy here. You might enjoy it, I guess. Then again, I have yet to meet someone who would actually enjoy herpes, but there is always a first time for everything.

It was 0200 on a cloudy, moonless night. A few minutes earlier, a special tactics team (STT) had just departed the aircraft to conduct a high-altitude low-opening parachute technique (HALO) insertion onto the airfield. As the STT prepared the drop zone, the aircraft came around to conduct a low-level airborne insertion of our team. Recent intelligence revealed that the airfield runway had two major craters and was also covered by debris consisting of damaged vehicles and dirt mounds. The area was also considered an uncertain environment, although it was expected to be a relatively permissive entry for our forces since no significant activity had been seen in or around the airfield for the past 24 hours by surveillance platforms. Our team inserted and immediately conducted a sweep of the runway and surrounding areas to identify hazards, mark unexploded ordnance (UXO), confirm surveillance information, and establish security around the airfield. Airborne engineers began the task of clearing the runway and at first light airfield opening leadership arrived via helicopter after the airfield was secured. Within 12 hours, airfield opening forces began to open and establish the airfield. Over the next several days, additional forces continued to arrive, and the airfield was fully operational. Although some areas of improvement were identified, one of the major successes noted was the seamless transition of airfield responsibility from initial forces to airfield opening and follow-on forces. This success was mainly attributed to the detailed planning of all participants for several weeks prior to the event.

1LT, special tactics team (STT), USAF

Yeah, I know. It was written by a 1LT in a Special Tactics Team. This is like listening to a PFC straight out of AIT in his first Air Traffic Services Company tell his facility chief how to integrate the larger airspace construct for flight following procedure development. Someone is going to get his head bounced off a console station, and it's probably not the NCO. Given the amount of critical data that a senior airfield authority and airfield management team needs to accomplish their nearly no-fail mission when they transition a new airfield from the seizure bubbas to the follow-on force, we couldn’t figure out what the benefit of that vignette was. And we were a pretty savy group too. The vignette pretty much said everything that everyone already knows: gee, opening and running an airfield is hard and dangerous and (when worded properly) a little sexier than everyone else’s job. Well, no sh*t, Sherlock! Why do you think they wrote a manual about it?

Mainly, I think we just resented that the vignette from a 1LT. After all, 1LT is 2LT… with intent.

So, after a couple  several  many  too many beers, this is what we writers came up with as a translation for the vignette of awesomesauceness:

It was a dark and stormy night. We showed up to the airfield. Nothing happened. We found some craters. We didn’t fill them. We found some explosive sh*t. We left that for the explosive ordinance dudes to deal with. No one shot at us. We landed a couple helicopters. We didn’t f*ck that up too egregiously. Once we’d stood around long enough, and looked requisitely sexy enough for some photographers from the New York Times, we left the airfield to the real controllers.

1LT (who was only allowed to speak when a Tech or Master Sergeant was present), special tactics team (STT), USAF

Moral of the story: don’t add vignettes to manuals. Doctrine writers will get drunk and laugh at delete them later.

"WHAAAAAA?"

I took off for the week to go write a multi-service publication about opening airfields. Since I’ve been well educated by my Minions, I’ve become my boss' go-to chick for all things airfield and tactical air traffic control related. I think it’s because he likes me finally. That, or he might be weirded out by me. I don’t know. I think I’ll favor the first one.

So, he likes me, and he said that I could go to Langley Air Force Base to rock out with the multi-service tactics, techniques and procedures (MTTP) gurus at the Air Land Sea Application Center, ALSA. Unlike joint pubs where everyone tries to out-do each other in awesomeness and attractiveness, multi-service ALSA pubs are supposed to be for the actual warfighters to use. So, when the chance came up to develop the Airfield Opening MTTP a little further for the poor beleaguered Senior Airfield Authorities of Army-land, I said that I would do it.

I feel bad for accidental SAA’s. This is, like, the one time that I have ever felt smarter than that guy about something. Just that once and it will probably never happen again!

When it comes to writing a publication about airfield opening, it should come as no surprise that the Air Force showed up with a whole entourage. I sit at the end of the table in the working group conference room with the token Marine Corps guy. We pretend that we understand what the Air Force is talking about when they say things like “employ the CRG to replace the STT and the AWG with their 89th Wingity Wing MFGSHSUS, 64th Squadron SUSHI.” Actually, I just nod my head and pretend like I know what they're saying because I can usually depend on the Marine Corps guy to speak up and admit that he has no clue what the Air Force is saying. He’s a stand up dude, that Marine. Takin’ one for the team!

So, since I’m speaking for all of Army Aviation about this really complicated Airfield Opening stuff, and every accidental SAA in the Army is looking to me to do the right thing, I felt a little thrown-under-the-bus when MAJ Braveheart, our working group coordinator, told me that some LTC (no doubt suffering from a severe case of ELTCS) from Leavenworth said that the Army didn’t need any more information about doing the SAA job because enough of it existed in joint and Army service doctrine.

Today, when choosing between importance and impotence to describe my job as a doctrine writer, impotence won.

The Marine Corps dude laughed at me.

I pretty much did this...

Reading the ATM before reinventing the wheel

I know the Army is constantly changing, but in reality there are very few times when we can actually hold a mighty battle sword aloft and honestly declare that we have REALLY invented the wheel. Every time the Army goes some place new, or we move to a new unit, or we burn poop in another country, it feels like the first time. “It feels like the verrrryyy first timmmme.” In all truth, it’s not. *le sigh* 

I know that you know that Afghanistan and Iraq are different places with different considerations regarding ROE, the enemy, the locals, the terrain, the fight, the reasons for occupation, yadda yadda. I’m not talking about the tactics that the enemy fighter. Enemy tactics will even vary within the borders of Afghanistan, from river valley to river valley. Tangi is not Helmand is most certainly not the Arghandab.  

But whether it’s a Wahhabist trained insurgent in the Pech Valley or a homegrown fighter from the streets of Mosul or a young infantryman from North Korea, it’s the same caliber of munitions. Your reaction will be the same: actions on contact. 

So, let’s discuss reacting to small arms. If you had the sudden urge to parrot, “Immediately deploy to concealment. If concealment is unavailable, make sharp turns of unequal magnitude and unequal intervals and small changes in altitude. Consider employment of immediate suppressive fire,” you’ve probably been asked that question on your APART before. Whether you are doing a pitch back turn, a break turn, or executing a cyclic climb to a push-over break, the reason and reaction to small arms fire remain the same. You know this because your Aircrew Training Manual says so.

But the ATM information had to come from somewhere, right?

Who wrote that?

Who figured it all out first?

Well, we did. “We” as in Army Aviation. Well, if we were still flying slick loaches, fat Hueys, and slim Cobras over triple canopy jungle in Southeast Asia, that is. This is not the first time that we have had to evade surface based small arms fire. Even if you change the name and claim you invented it (Wells Maneuver, anyone?), it’s still the same ol’ bullets. You don’t need to be told by an S-2 how prevalent small arms fire is and how you need to avoid it because the ATM beat him to it! Of course, doctrine only works if you read it.

The truth is that enemy fire occurs where you fly. It doesn’t occur where you don’t fly. Enemy small arms fire at helicopters transiting through an area is not an indicator of how many insurgents live or ply their trade there. Most engagements of helicopters with small arms are targets of opportunity, made available by pilots developing patterns and other general pilot stupidity. The enemy is going to do what it always does: shoot at you. The question is what will you do when that happens?

Happy 2012... now here's some new terms you'll need for your OER this year!

I had a moment last week at the Penthouse while we were working on the new FM 3-04, Army Aviation Operations. I’d just found out that full spectrum operations was being stricken from use in doctrine and terminology, and I was fielding a bunch of emails about the lexicon changes, and getting really mad about it. People kept asking me if we were going to change the name of the Full Spectrum CAB, and I wanted to tell them that I would get right on that as soon as the Army promoted me to Major General, gave me my very own parking spot, a lifetime supply of pickles and vodka (and chocolate), and the complete authority to rename all combat aviation brigades with silly names.

Because I would call them all things like Daniel Craig Aviation Brigade.

Or Sam Worthington Aviation Brigade.

Or Jimmy Choo Peep Toe Red Python Slingbacks Aviation Brigade.

Or Vodka Aviation Brigade.

This will likely happen around the same time as never. Instead I typed polite email responses in a very authoritative and irritated manner, leaving the F-key embedded in my desk top.

Words have meaning. Aviation knows this better than any other branch of the service, given our propensity towards brevity codes that only the Air Force knows (because we refuse to pay attention to that stuff), execution checklists for Air Assaults (which no one pays attention to until someone f*cks up), and various numerously-lined attack briefs that are tucked into the pocket-sized, no-rip pages of the JFIRE MTTP (where the Infantry mistakes CCA for CAS every gottdamm time). We are a branch of words, ones that we value very closely because they describe exactly how we do what it is that we do… which we do well… until we screw it up… then we can make up fancy words to blame someone else.

Here is the long and short of the new changes for terminology in the 2012 (which will probably change again in five or six months anyway, so I wouldn’t even bother if I were you):

FSO is dead. Long live FSO? It should come as no surprise that Full Spectrum Operations is entirely gone from the lexicon now.

I’ll give you a moment to mourn its passing… *sniffle*… okay, moment over.

Briefly, when ADP 3-0 was first published in April 2011, full spectrum operations lingered as collective term for the simultaneous application of offense, defense, and defense support of civil authorities in support of the Army’s new operating concept: unified land operations. At that same moment, the world of the Army was awash in 10-page little ACU-covered books talking about our new operating concept. Suddenly, the AUSA convention looked like a rally for ACU-clad field grade officers clutching the ADP 3-0 like they were the second coming of communist students toting their little red books. Then, at the trailing end of 2011, full spectrum operations was stricken from use completely, and is now replaced with decisive action.

Conversely, we’d all like to know if there will be a discussion in the Change 1 of ADP 3-0 that also discusses indecisive action as well.

Oh, and if you’re wondering what will happen to 101^st Combat Aviation Brigade now that it can no longer thrust the name “Full Spectrum CAB” aloft like a mighty battle sword, I wouldn’t fret too much about it. I mean, we could just do something radical, and simply call it a CAB.

DSCA Dancing into 2012! Defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) is replacing civil support, which is just bringing us online with the joint community. It’s a one-for-one swap. I can’t think of a single person that would have a problem with using the phrase civil support, but sounds cool to say disc-kah. Try it. DISC-KAH. You can say it twice in a row, if you feel so inclined. Disc-kah-disc-kah.

Ranging the Spectrum! So, with full spectrum operations going the way of the dodo, it shouldn’t surprise anyone that the terms spectrum of conflict and operational themes are also gone. I have only ever heard these terms from men who have far more rank and power than I could ever hope to have. I’m sure they will be heartbroken about it, but *shrug* meh, whatevs. Not that these were ever formally defined in Army doctrine, but these buzz phrases have come to mean varying things and have been causing confusion since they were conceived. Kind of like the platypus. The joint community uses the phrase the range of military operations, which is well defined in joint doctrine regarding our operational environment and current conflicts. I’m sure there is someone who is very concerned about this. I’m sure he also got an OER bullet for it.

Do you remember any of this?
Oh, that's right. You were sleeping
in the back of the classroom in a puddle
of your own drool.

Speaking of Operational Environment… Operational environment now replaces the term battlespace, which was frequently misused as a synonym for area of operations. Battlespace is an obsolete term, until we start fighting in space against the alien zombie space hookers from another galaxy. Further, operational environment is not synonymous with area of operation (like how CCA is not synonymous with CAS), just in case the Aviation Captains’ Career Course crowd was wondering.  Operational environment does not refer to a piece of ground denoted by boundaries and assigned to a unit, nor does it refer to the security environment at large. Just in case you forgot, or you were too hungover that day in the advanced course.

Mission Command, commanding the mission, and the Commander. Mission command replaced the Army doctrinal term command and control. The former command and control warfighting function is also now called the mission command warfighting function. Are you confused yet? Don’t worry, you will be. The function of command and the function of control are still valid for the Army (as they have always been), but not when combined into a single phrase or function. So, when discussing Army operations command and control (or C2) is an obsolete term. But, in case you’ve been delving into the joint doctrine recently, you should be advised that the joint community still uses command and control and C2 in their lexicon. NOW I WILL CONFUSE YOU EVEN MORE! The term battle command is also rescinded. This obsolete term had several different definitions over the past two decades and often was misused as a synonym for command and control, kind of like misusing full spectrum operations all the gottdamm time. The commander’s role in the operations process (the way he or she understands, visualizes, describes, directs, leads and assesses their mission in PowerPoint slides) remains in Army doctrine but is no longer referred to as battle command. It’s referred to as mission command now. Hence mission command is now both a warfighting function and a process of leadership.

I’ll give you a moment to digest all that. The Doctrinatrix needs a drink.

Campaigning for jointness (or: Doobie is a joint term)! The Army does not conduct campaigns, except for that suicide prevention "campaign" that dragged us on a 1.5 mile run at a 15:00 min/mile pace at 4:30 in the morning in order to "raise morale." Joint doctrine is very specific on the topic of who does campaigns. Joint force headquarters plan and execute campaigns and major operations, while the Service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) of the joint force conduct subordinate major operations (with lots of angry, disgruntled Majors), battles and engagements, but not independent campaigns. This is straight from the JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.  Army plans that span a significant period are simply long-range plans, or land wars in Asia.

And, finally… ISR’we or aren’t we? In Army doctrine, the term intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is obsolete, and Army doctrine does not use this term or acronym to describe Army operations. The individual components will be spelled out… because Microsoft has autocorrect and spell check and you won’t have to worry about spelling reconnaissance wrong all the time. Army doctrine uses reconnaissance and surveillance (and Google) to refer to the collection of information (and porn). So, to sum it up, we don’t do ISR. To expand on this a little further, we also do not use the term armed reconnaissance to describe the use of attack reconnaissance helicopters or armed unmanned aircraft systems to accomplish reconnaissance missions. All reconnaissance is armed. Unless it’s unarmed. Then it’s just asking for trouble.

So, yeah, words do have meaning. Modifying nouns with trendy adjectives, such as full spectrum, full dimension, outstanding, distributed, agile, and dominant, rarely adds meaning. In fact, it never adds meaning. It’s filler. It causes everyone to feel inadequate to the task of reading it, like there should be some deep hidden meaning. In the past three years, full spectrum appeared—incorrectly—to modify almost anything to make it sound better, as an example. Full Spectrum Operations. Full Spectrum CAB. Full Spectrum Support. Full Spectrum Speculum.

Seriously? Haven’t we always been Full Spectrum? That phrase was never even meant what we thought it meant anyway. We kept thinking that it meant we could do tons of sh*t, but it really just means that we’re bright and colorful. Then again, at the rate we keep changing uniform patterns, we might just end up really being full spectrum after all.

So, Happy New Year from the All Fun Happens family! I just hope your publications accounts are ready for Change 2.0 for the ADP!