Demonstrating Combat Power



See? Doctrine is fun. How else do we learn about
aerial interdiction against sneaky Russians?

Can a working group full of aviation doctrine writers be fun? You might say "no." I say "yes." It's because I find good doctrine sexy. 

Today my boss started off our weekly work group for our new collection of Army Aviation manuals with reading an excerpt from an article regarding the Doctrine 2015 program, which will lead to restructuring Army doctrine into something usable and functional for the warfighter. Since I’ve been living the Doctrine 2015 dream for about six months now, I’m immune to the platitudes of a speech writer’s pandering in articles from Fort Leavenworth, the Intellectual Center of Nowhereinparticular. My boss continued to read a section about Unified Land Operations and ADP 3-0 and something he said caught my attention.

“There is nothing new about the concept of seizing, retaining and exploiting the initiative in order to achieve military goals. It is the essence of what Army leaders do and have done throughout history. We force our adversaries to fight on our terms, at times and places of our choosing, and in ways that place them at the greatest disadvantage. We achieve a superior position through the destruction of enemy forces, capabilities or sources by seizing key terrain, protecting key populations, building partner capacity or through a tailored combination of these.”—LTG David Perkins and CPT Nathan Finney

So, first of all, this is a great selling point for everything I love about attack and reconnaissance: seizing, retaining and exploiting the initiative, forcing our adversaries to fight on our terms, and achieving a superior position through the destruction of enemy forces. Then I got stuck thinking about the phrase “fighting on our terms.”

Here is the problem with that little nugget: when have we, in aviation, ever gotten to choose the terms that we fight with? Sure, the combined arms team can drive the fight with the proper demonstration and application of combat power at the right time and place. But it was the nebulous side of “fighting on our terms” had me wondering… the things we cannot control as pilots.

Try though I may, I cannot control weather. I cannot choose to fight in places where the climate has only reasonably mild temperatures, low density and pressure altitude, sits around sea level, with only favorable winds, and level or open terrain. If that were the case, I would be fighting a war in south eastern Alabama. 

Since you cannot pick the climate and terrain of where the fight will be, you have to know how to demonstrate and apply combat power in a judicious manner in any location. Typically, this location includes, but is not limited to: high temperatures, high pressure altitude, heavy loads of weapons and fuel, and confining terrain. It's not ideal. 

Then there is this thing:

Yeah. I’ll give you a second to recover from that. Oh, and if you cringed when the helicopter hit, you’re not alone. I’m sure the split second when the aircrew realized they were not going to recover this maneuver, just before they pancaked that aircraft, they probably cringed a little too.

If you’re not familiar with what the aircrew was trying to do, it’s called a cyclic climb to a coordinated turn, or a return-to-target. It’s used a method combat maneuvering flight to quickly reengage a target and keep a low profile for returning surface fires. It requires good coordination between cyclic, collective, and antitorque pedals. It requires the aircrew to be cognizant of where the winds are coming from, so they can terminate the maneuver favorably. It also means that they must be aware that, when space for adequate recovery at the end of maneuver is not available, you need power… which isn’t always available in high, hot conditions with restrictive terrain.

The first time I ever saw a RTT was as a young LT in OIF II. I was with an experienced IP who executed the maneuver during an engagement. Everything went perfect. He terminated into the wind, he had protected ample power for the inevitable cushion he’d need at the end, and he kept the aircraft in trim the whole time. When all was said and done, and we were safely flying back to FOB Warhorse for post-mission debrief and cocktails, he asked me if I would “like to learn how to do that.” This is like asking a fat kid if they would like their cake with a side of cake. 

It took ages before I felt comfortable doing them in an environment like Iraq. And by “comfortable,” I mean I wasn’t removing the seat cover from butt at the end of the maneuver. Frankly, I doubt that I would ever be completely comfortable doing them in Afghanistan. I don’t even like making left turns in Iraq or Nosnatchistan in an OH-58D.

We don’t get to delay the fight for favorable conditions. The enemy knows that too. They pick places to fight where aircrews are always at a disadvantage. They love to fight in box canyons in the foothills of the Himalayas. They seem to enjoy operations in urban desert terrain, where lines of inner-visibility are restricted by shacks and crumbling buildings filled with equally freaked out civilians. With restrictions like that, it’s amazing what good pilots have been able to accomplish on behalf of ground forces in past decade.

You don’t get to pick where you fight. You can pick how and where you train for your fight though. No matter what happens, we have an obligation to protect our combat power for later… so we can demonstrate it correctly… by f*ckin’ up some bad guys with our munitions.  

Airspace planning?

No one is really certain how to integrate unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace structure. We’re figuring it out with the aid of the Federal Aviation Administration. See? Army can play nicely with other agencies. Sometimes. Without further ado, I give you…

 ... Something Overheard Today!

"Unmanned aircraft are hazardous to aviation, so they must fly within special use airspace."

"Ok. Can I get some special airspace?"

"What for?"

"To fly my UAS."

"No. Special airspace isn't granted to fly unmanned systems."

“But you just said…”

“These aren’t the drones you’re looking for. Move along.” <hand wave>

Fast forward to a little later…

“Can I get some airspace for my… ermm… firing range?”

“What weapon systems will you employ there?”

“Laser point… I mean, laser designators.”

“Approved!”

“I also wannaaaaa… flydronesthroughit.”

“No problemo!”

*facepalm*

Airspace planning for cooperative employment training: not for the faint- of- heart or absent- of- laser- designator.

BEHOLD! The world's most deadly hazard to airspace
operations: the RQ-7B Shadow. Shown here just prior to
launch... where it was waiting, just waaaiiiiting, to strike fear in
the hearts of every NAS user through the tactical application
of its ability to look at random things.
Yeah... I know. Really threatening, huh?

OPSEC PSA (or why YouTube is not a repository for gun tape)

I understand why gun tape is awesome to watch. Really. I do. I’ve been forced to watch enough gun tape to put me off watching gun tape forever. 

Gun tape, especially with meta data still visible, is not for public consumption. Neither is engagement feed from unmanned aircraft systems or post-engagement battle damage assessment footage. These things are part of the collective body of protected knowledge of coalition warfighters that, if not controlled, can lead to damage for both air and ground forces alike.

Remember when that group of Marines peed on the remains of Taliban fighters they had just shot? People, specifically terrorists and certain members of the hippy-hug-a-tree-make-love-not-war-organic-karob-hash-brownie-career-college-student-99%er-hispter-with-scarf-and-iphone-and-Starbucks-Occupy-whatevs crowd, will use it to do nefarious things. More importantly, it delegitimizes the efforts of our coalition forces in the combat zone. 

Aviation attack reconnaissance units will typically consolidate, store, cut and prepare gun tape for numerous reasons. Whether it’s used by the battalion or squadron master gunner to aid in the targeting and weaponeering education of young pilots or to justify specific (or even questionable) engagements, gun tape is not for general public consumption.

In short, whether it belongs to you or not, please don’t post gun tape on the internet. Or video of you and your fire team peeing on the lifeless remains of enemy fighters. Frankly, that’s just weird and gross. 

Mission Command and the Air Mission Commander: why air ground integration totally rocks my socks and ADP 6-0 totally validates the close combat attack!



Ground dudes. Pilots. Working together.
In harmony. Playing nicely. What is the
world coming to?
(Camp Taji, Iraq. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Travis Zielinski)

I love the philosophy of mission command. It's sexy. 

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. (ADP 6-0, page 2)

How can you be a pilot and not find that sexy because that’s totally an introduction to things that are even sexier? Air ground integration things. You know, Army Aviation pitched a fit about how we didn’t have our own warfighting function, which is ridiculous. We are a part of every warfighting function, especially the movement and maneuver function and the mission command function! Even better? The principles and philosophies of mission command, the more esoteric side of leader empowerment, is totally a case for air ground integration.

Which, of course, totally begets the close combat attack (CCA)! But more on that in just a second.

So, examining the principles of mission command. Let’s take a peek, shall we?

1. Build cohesive teams through mutual trust. That’s tactical trust, people. We’ve discussed that puppy before. Tactical trust, the ability of a commander to intrinsically know that their junior leadership is executing the mission in accordance with their desired intent and end state, is critical to doing combined arms operations. As aircrews, our segregation from the ground force commander by virtue of modularity means that we have to work even harder to inspire trust in the ground force commander. We have to make the effort to nest ourselves, our plans and our effects, with what the ground force commander needs. Integrate early, integrate often, I always say. Then again, I’ve also been known to say drink vodka early, drink vodka often… take my advice for what it’s worth, and only when I’m sober.

2. Create a shared understanding. This is situational understanding (or situational awareness, if you haven’t gotten that memo yet). Situational understanding has to be a shared idea and picture of the battlefield, or your missions will never nest quite right with the ground force’s missions. You have to see what they see, know what they know, and speak the same intent and end state. Since aviation can’t hold and clear ground, the mission we embrace and share must be with the ground forces. Every piece of information or bit of intelligence we garner must be for them, with them in mind always! It’s very codependent, but not in that creepy drunk-ex-girlfield-beating-on-your-front-door-at-2am-on-a-Wednesday-night kind of way.

3. Provide a clear commander’s intent. This is kinda sorta obvious because mission command’s definition of “enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent” tells us that the commander’s intent is really driving the train for this one. If you are a commander, hoping that you can embrace a little shared tactical trust with your subordinates, you have to have a good commander’s intent for them to work with. One that is clear, concise, and decisive in nature will inspire a feeling of trust within your subordinates… who, in turn, will operate within your intent to meet your end state, which inspires your trust in them. It’s like a tactical group hug (where, after a couple of weeks in the field, all the huggers smell like feet).

4. Exercise disciplined initiative. Initiative is the willingness to act in the absence of orders. There are going to be times when the commander can’t foresee the future events of the enemy or civilian populace, but a response is needed. The foundations of tactical trust, the principles of mission command, gives subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment to the situation, know the intent of their commander, and choose a course of action that will keep the mission moving in a positive direction.  We’re not Russians. We don’t need the commander to provide new orders for everything, especially when you’re growing junior leaders in an environment that fosters discipline, professionalism, and good decision making.

5. Use mission orders. Speaking of issuing new mission orders… mission orders are directives that emphasize which results are to be attained, not how the results are attained. It’s effects based planning. We figure out what the end state should be, based on the shared understanding of our environment, and then we figure out the best method to achieve those effects without going outside of the commander’s intent. This sounds eerily like an introduction to air ground integration, right? We plan for the effect we want, not for the system we want. You might get a ground force commander who thinks he needs eight Chinooks for his company sized air assault, but he really just needs a little interaction with the aircrews to help him figure out what best meets his needs for quickly arriving at the objective to retain surprise and speed of maneuver.

6. Accept prudent risk. This is tougher for leaders working with aircrews. Prudent risk is a deliberate thing that exposes us purposefully to potential injury or loss when the commander believes the mission accomplishment is worth the cost. Opportunity comes with risk. But risk, when properly planned for and mitigated, can lead to tactical rewards, especially when subordinates trust that leadership knows what they are doing. Take Stonewall Jackson for instance. His men cheerfully accepted the process of being maneuvered over long distances, knowing that their leadership was doing so to flank and maneuver to advantageous positions. This meant that, when it came to engage, GEN Jackson’s forces were ideally suited and positioned to win. His subordinates knew that, down to the infantryman level, and trusted the judgment of the leadership. Mucho sexy.

So, how does mission command totally rock my air ground integrated socks and validate the sexiness of CCA? Like this.

Picture the six principles of mission command. Now read this:

“Operations must be integrated so air and ground forces can simultaneously work in the operational environment to achieve a common objective.  Air-Ground Integration (AGI) is a process that allows ground maneuver commanders to maximize combat power by synchronizing the maneuver, fires, and effects of both aviation and ground forces to accomplish a stated mission.  Integrating aviation units into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver increases the capability of the ground maneuver force by drastically improving speed, range, flexibility and lethality, beyond the normal capabilities of a stand-alone ground maneuver unit.” (CW4 Anthony Parrott, USAACE DOTD Gunnery Branch)

Let’s pull this statement apart, shall we?

“Operations must be integrated so air and ground forces can simultaneously work in the operational environment to achieve a common objective” Sounds like building a team through mutual trust and common goal, right?

Or how about this?

“Air-Ground Integration (AGI) is a process that allows ground maneuver commanders to maximize combat power by synchronizing the maneuver, fires, and effects of both aviation and ground forces to accomplish a stated mission.” If that isn’t team building, with a healthy nod to the need for a clearly stated commander’s intent and effects-based planning, I don’t know what is!

Orrrrr, my personal favorite…

“Integrating aviation units into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver increases the capability of the ground maneuver force by drastically improving speed, range, flexibility and lethality, beyond the normal capabilities of a stand-alone ground maneuver unit.” Based on the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver, intent and end state, we combine our initiatives to increase our shared lethality, mitigating the tactical risks of working alone on a highly fluid battlefield!

You can’t help but nod in agreement, right? You’re all, “that’s so right, Doctrinatrix. I totally see what you mean now. I’m going to go read ADP 6-0 and find some hidden meaning right now.”

BUT WAIT there’s more. I know, as if this couldn’t get any sexier than it already is?

Let’s look at our old friend, the close combat attack.

This is usually the point where Whackhawk pilots will mentally check out, and go to their happy place (which is typically filled with manicures and pink mega-girly-drinks). And, yet, I have managed to brainwash the man they call Starbuck to my CCA-is-sexy cause, and he’s a Whackhawk pilot. Soooo, THAT should tell you how important this all is, people…

The close combat attack is both boon and curse to the attack reconnaissance community and the ground forces they support. Enabling the ability for the ground force commander to achieve effects with aerial munitions, the use of the close combat attack tends to be restricted to troops-in-contact scenarios. Where CCA and CAS, close air support, differ is the requirement for terminal control of platform for munitions use and release. But it’s suggestive of the nature of CAS's evil twin (according to the Marine Corps), the CCA. High degrees of mutual situational understanding, shared knowledge of the ground force commander’s intent and missions, and shared tactical risk link air and ground assets in good air ground integration, which means that both have a vested interested in the successful outcome of an engagement. I don’t need a trained babysitter to tell me what headings to turn inbound on, what munition to use, or when to press to the trigger. As an air mission commander, pilot in command, and professional Army aviator, I know what to do because I have hedged my bets favorably through dutiful study and integration with the ground force I support! Mission command begets the sharing of missions, fosters the cooperation of tactical parties, and advances junior leaders to exercise disciplined initiative within their commander’s sound, solid intent. All of this gets us back to ground force commander having tactical trust in the air mission commander to do the right thing because the lives of his soldiers (and civilians in his area of operations) depend upon that!

This is why mission command is really a case for air ground integration and why I think it’s so freakin’ sexy.

Chances are, now you think it’s sexy too!