Demonstrating Combat Power



See? Doctrine is fun. How else do we learn about
aerial interdiction against sneaky Russians?

Can a working group full of aviation doctrine writers be fun? You might say "no." I say "yes." It's because I find good doctrine sexy. 

Today my boss started off our weekly work group for our new collection of Army Aviation manuals with reading an excerpt from an article regarding the Doctrine 2015 program, which will lead to restructuring Army doctrine into something usable and functional for the warfighter. Since I’ve been living the Doctrine 2015 dream for about six months now, I’m immune to the platitudes of a speech writer’s pandering in articles from Fort Leavenworth, the Intellectual Center of Nowhereinparticular. My boss continued to read a section about Unified Land Operations and ADP 3-0 and something he said caught my attention.

“There is nothing new about the concept of seizing, retaining and exploiting the initiative in order to achieve military goals. It is the essence of what Army leaders do and have done throughout history. We force our adversaries to fight on our terms, at times and places of our choosing, and in ways that place them at the greatest disadvantage. We achieve a superior position through the destruction of enemy forces, capabilities or sources by seizing key terrain, protecting key populations, building partner capacity or through a tailored combination of these.”—LTG David Perkins and CPT Nathan Finney

So, first of all, this is a great selling point for everything I love about attack and reconnaissance: seizing, retaining and exploiting the initiative, forcing our adversaries to fight on our terms, and achieving a superior position through the destruction of enemy forces. Then I got stuck thinking about the phrase “fighting on our terms.”

Here is the problem with that little nugget: when have we, in aviation, ever gotten to choose the terms that we fight with? Sure, the combined arms team can drive the fight with the proper demonstration and application of combat power at the right time and place. But it was the nebulous side of “fighting on our terms” had me wondering… the things we cannot control as pilots.

Try though I may, I cannot control weather. I cannot choose to fight in places where the climate has only reasonably mild temperatures, low density and pressure altitude, sits around sea level, with only favorable winds, and level or open terrain. If that were the case, I would be fighting a war in south eastern Alabama. 

Since you cannot pick the climate and terrain of where the fight will be, you have to know how to demonstrate and apply combat power in a judicious manner in any location. Typically, this location includes, but is not limited to: high temperatures, high pressure altitude, heavy loads of weapons and fuel, and confining terrain. It's not ideal. 

Then there is this thing:

Yeah. I’ll give you a second to recover from that. Oh, and if you cringed when the helicopter hit, you’re not alone. I’m sure the split second when the aircrew realized they were not going to recover this maneuver, just before they pancaked that aircraft, they probably cringed a little too.

If you’re not familiar with what the aircrew was trying to do, it’s called a cyclic climb to a coordinated turn, or a return-to-target. It’s used a method combat maneuvering flight to quickly reengage a target and keep a low profile for returning surface fires. It requires good coordination between cyclic, collective, and antitorque pedals. It requires the aircrew to be cognizant of where the winds are coming from, so they can terminate the maneuver favorably. It also means that they must be aware that, when space for adequate recovery at the end of maneuver is not available, you need power… which isn’t always available in high, hot conditions with restrictive terrain.

The first time I ever saw a RTT was as a young LT in OIF II. I was with an experienced IP who executed the maneuver during an engagement. Everything went perfect. He terminated into the wind, he had protected ample power for the inevitable cushion he’d need at the end, and he kept the aircraft in trim the whole time. When all was said and done, and we were safely flying back to FOB Warhorse for post-mission debrief and cocktails, he asked me if I would “like to learn how to do that.” This is like asking a fat kid if they would like their cake with a side of cake. 

It took ages before I felt comfortable doing them in an environment like Iraq. And by “comfortable,” I mean I wasn’t removing the seat cover from butt at the end of the maneuver. Frankly, I doubt that I would ever be completely comfortable doing them in Afghanistan. I don’t even like making left turns in Iraq or Nosnatchistan in an OH-58D.

We don’t get to delay the fight for favorable conditions. The enemy knows that too. They pick places to fight where aircrews are always at a disadvantage. They love to fight in box canyons in the foothills of the Himalayas. They seem to enjoy operations in urban desert terrain, where lines of inner-visibility are restricted by shacks and crumbling buildings filled with equally freaked out civilians. With restrictions like that, it’s amazing what good pilots have been able to accomplish on behalf of ground forces in past decade.

You don’t get to pick where you fight. You can pick how and where you train for your fight though. No matter what happens, we have an obligation to protect our combat power for later… so we can demonstrate it correctly… by f*ckin’ up some bad guys with our munitions.