Doctrine doesn't fix everything.

Doctrine. It is the cause of, and solution to, all of my problems. I write good doctrine, I get praised and the terrorists lose. I write bad doctrine, and the terrorists win. My boss also does that silently-staring-because-I'm-disappointed-in-you thing. That’s actually worse than terrorists winning.

Often times we fall back to criticism of existing documents and doctrine as the reason for why things didn’t quite turn out as we expected. It’s as though we want doctrine to do for us what we refuse to do for ourselves: fill the gaps in knowledge that exist because... well... sometimes there is sh*t we just don't know. Pilots and aviation leaders want a comprehensive checklist solution to certain tactical problems that will be 99% effective in ensuring mission success, a placated ground force commander, joy, happiness, satisfied aircrews, puppies for all good little boys and girls, and a loaf in every oven. Doctrine just doesn’t work that way. It really doesn’t work that way for aviation.

Take manned- unmanned operations, for instance. The process of mixing unmanned aircraft and manned helicopters in reconnaissance tasks was a heavy topic on the list things to discuss at  the Aviation Synch Conference last week. The real gripes came from staff planners. Staffers rarely find the same level of joy in talking with other staffers that pilots find in talking to each other.  

And unfortunately, that’s the point at which air ground integration (AGI) tends to break down: the staff-to-staff communication.

So, if mission analysis and staff nug work is where AGI starts (in theory)… but it doesn’t (in reality)… then we should all simply give up now and start drinking.

I know. “But, Wings, it’s only noon and you’re flying this afternoon?” Spare me your AR 40-8 quotes, and save them for your APART. I’m an aviation doctrine writer. I have an escape clause in all Army Regulations.

In reality, the work load is double for aviators supporting ground forces in a COIN environment. Aviation is required to be familiar with their own impact on the ground force’s efforts in the local area of operations. In a COIN fight, we need to step up our game and be familiar with all aspects of the ground force commander’s intent. This is especially so for attack reconnaissance pilots. You have two masters, and you must ensure equal loyalty to both… no matter how much study and leg work you face. Lives and legitimacy depend upon it. It will take away from your time playing Call of Duty while waiting for a QRF launch. Bummer.

So, when the staff fails to truly integrate during mission analysis, it triples the work load of aircrews conducting air ground integration. You are, in a sense, picking up the slack for what your planners failed to provide. 

The majority of AGI breakdowns in planning occur at the brigade and battalion level. And, yet, there are tools a’plenty located at the BCT to facilitate this. The most crucial of these tools? The Brigade Aviation Element. Okay, I admit to being historically snarky against BAEs. On the other hand, some of the best people I know have worked in the element. These are guys who have actively pursued the advancement of aviation’s integration into the planning of all ground missions, especially the ones that would benefit from aerial fires. Not all forces get aviation support. Not all missions need an attack weapons team. Not all patrols get a pair of scouts. Not all named areas of interest get a Shadow loitering overhead. Not all cargo needs to be strapped to the floor of a Chinook. Aviation is not a panacea for every ill on the battlefield, but that should not stop the aviation staff from actively dialoguing with the ground planners. It should not stop the BAE from questioning whether a mission could be made stronger by the application of the right air resources at the right time.

When aviation allows itself to be marginalized at the staff and planning levels, it marginalizes its ability to project combat power. It willingly allows itself to remain as only an enabler, and then starts a self-deprecating cycle of both allowing itself to be shelved as merely “support” and then believing the hype about being shelved for “supporting roles only.” 

The questions every brigade S-3 should ask, whether ground or air, should be:

1. Have I allowed the BAE to become the least common denominator for my aviation planning? Did I bring the myth of “BAE as an extra AMR cell” on to myself? Did I train them? Did I allow them to train themselves? Have I fostered them enough to encourage open and honest review of aviation integration? Or am I using them as extra night battle captains?

2. Have I talked with my counterpart in the air or ground TOC today? Do I know what his commander’s intent is? Have I fostered AGI with my efforts today?

3. Would my TOC drink a couple beers with the other guy’s TOC? Do they think as one team? Or are they divided by the fundamental cry of “us versus them?”

Doctrine can’t solve all problems, but just about every problem a staff might encounter is in doctrine somewhere. It’s just not always Aviation Doctrine.

The trick is not knowing where to look, it’s knowing who to talk with... which typically starts with the staff and a manual that might not always be "aviation."

Military Spouse Appreciation Day

It should come as no surprise that Military Spouse Appreciation Day is the Friday before Mother’s Day weekend. This is a day where we celebrate the spouses- male and female- who keep the service members marching in the right direction. 

I could wax poetic about the military spouse and her (or his) role in the ability of the Armed Forces to rapidly project military might and power to our enemies around the world, but that would be pandering.

Instead, I made you this. Enjoy!

Carrying a Message to the Senior Airfield Authority

FM 3-04.120, Air Traffic Services Operations, blows. I’m just going to state that right out front. I’m not sure who wrote it, or what their method was, but it left some pretty large gaps in doctrine. Those gaps are now being addressed as we conduct the process of writing mind-numbing mind-altering aviation doctrine. I swear to you that we are trying to fix that problem.

But sobriety keeps getting in the way.

See that over there? That's all the money you
won't be getting for airfield management
training this year. Or ever.

Why is there nothing addressing the critical gap of knowledge about airfield managers (AFM) and senior airfield authorities (SAA) in our current Army doctrine? Why isn’t it all spelled out for us like a checklist in an appendix, where we can gloss over the topic and get back to the business of flying helicopters? It’s a big topic over at the Air Traffic Services Senior Leaders’ Conference this year, being hosted this week by the good folks from the Air Traffic Services Command  (command motto: Bring us your tired, your weary, your wretched masses yearning to have their facility training programs violated by our quality assurance inspection team). ATSCOM has done the best that it can in a rapidly impending atmosphere of budget cuts and doom regarding defense spending. It’s true, we are continuing to dump millions into AH-64D Longbow software updates, as well as the M-model Whackhawk and F-model Chinoodle modifications, but those are the money-maker platforms for aviation right now. Unfortunately, as the aviation budget shrinks, the ATS community will have to do more without resources. Not to mention, all the ATS budget will be sucked up by ATNAVICS radar repairs anyway.

So, where does that leave training dollars for SAA and AFM training? Nonexistent. I’m sorry, but here is the part where I tell you to go put on your big boy or girl panties (or maybe you’re a dude who likes to wear big girl panties, I dunno. Maybe you also fly a Whackhawk?) and drive on, my friend. If you’re waiting for ATSCOM to produce AFM and SAA training for everyone in every brigade, we should probably address a little something called “expectation management.”

The truth is that ATSCOM has tried to get to the root of the problem with digitally exportable training packages (now available online), mobile training teams that come to your brigade or battalion, and a week-long contingency airfield management workshop that allows you to pet the wild theodolite in its native habitat. In trying to address the gaps in doctrine that discuss the roles and responsibilities for an AFM and SAA, we’ve nested ourselves with existing joint and federal regulations and are expanding on the unique considerations and limitations associated with austere airfields. The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center even joined the fray, uniting all of the branches in one room for a Beyond Thunderdome-style cage match where the victor would receive top billing on the new and improved Airfield Opening multiservice tactics, techniques, and procedures guide.

And still, we have a C-17 stuck in the mud on FOB Shank. Not kidding. C-17. In the mud. At Shank airfield in the middle of Logar Province. Nosnatchistan. Aces.

And there is probably some SAA standing on the roof of his TOC, looking out towards the airfield that he is endowed with authority and responsibility for (as per the joint task force commander), and asking himself what he did do deserve this in the first place. I’m sorry, sir. According to regulation, it’s all your fault. It’s a bummer, man. You should probably fire your airfield manager and start chain smoking Marlboros now. Maybe you’ll get lucky, by the time the accident investigation team wraps up their report, a stray enemy mortar will land on your plastic port-a-john, and the airfield will be the least of your concerns. 

Yes, the SAA has been delegated authority and responsibility for this strip of airfield and its associated surfaces and hazards. At the same time, blame should not rest completely on the SAA. ATS company commanders (who typically get the title of AFM thrust upon them), controllers, and pilots share that airspace and that blame. Especially the commanders.

Yesterday, I heard the commander of ATSCOM announce that they were developing a course for would-be ATS company commanders. It would run in conjunction with ATSCOM’s previously developed week-long airfield management work shop. This would give the unfortunate slob who find himself staring down the barrel of an ATS company command, and likely AFM duties, a foundation to be an effective leader to his new-found Minions.

Let’s consider this for a moment.

When a company commander in the Armor is suddenly told that he will have to conduct Infantry operations in the mountains of Againistan, he scratches his head, busts out the old doctrine, has a powwow with his officers and NCOs, and develops a training schedule that will meet the intent for his mission. He’s a captain and commander, and the success of his unit as part of a larger organization depends upon the foundations he puts in place before going to war.

Two other things this week caught my attention, along with COL(P) Macklin’s announcement.

I found a scribble on post-it note from when my boss gave this totally awesome synopsis about the battle of Shiloh. In case you don’t follow military history, it was the 150th anniversary of the battle a couple of weeks ago. He geeks out on history. Yes, I took notes during the lecture. This particular note was significant. He mentioned that, during the early days of the all-volunteer force that would comprise the Army of the Potomac, leaders were learning combat operations as they went. At camps of instruction all across the north, young officers learned how to engage their formations by candle light, and then taught it during daylight to their forces. He called it the greatest “ad hocracy” ever. I agree. Shiloh, in case you fell asleep during American history class, was the first significant victory for the northern Army. I might also add that it was totally done by a volunteer force of citizen soldiers.

The second thing I found was a return of A Message to Garcia to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s reading list. I love this essay because it takes on different meaning as you get older, as your views on the world change with the levels of increased responsibility you face. Message, which has developed a cult-like following around the world, fell away from the reading list for a while and then popped back up recently when GEN Dempsey slotted it in again. Written and initially printed in 1899 in a small publication called The Philistine,  it was the brainchild of Elbert Hubbard. It examines the actions of a young officer named Rowan who is given a specific task, to carry a message on behalf of the President of the United States to the rebel fighter Calixto Garcia in the mountain jungles of Cuba. If you haven’t read it, or you claim that you’ve read it but you really haven’t, you should check it out. It's short. In all truth, Hubbard was a soap seller turned craftsman, integral to the expansion of the arts and crafts movement… which is pretty much what everyone remembers the man for. Pretty chairs. Nice furniture. Bungalow houses.

So, what does the rambling of a teetotaling socialist craftsman and book printer from East Aurora, New York, have to do with the military, aviation, and air traffic control company commanders? Elbert Hubbard, who was coincidently killed when the Lusitania was sunk by a German Unterseeboot in WW1, wrote a theme that resonates for most senior leaders who have high expectations of their junior officers: if I give you a job, go figure it out and do it.

Sometimes you get jobs or missions that you have no prior knowledge of or experience in. That’s pretty much the nature of the game for most air traffic control company commanders. It is up to us to do the job of self-education, followed with the job of training our formation. You don’t need ATSCOM to babysit you through the process. You should feel offended that they even made that assumption about you!

GEN Dempsey charged forward with the program to redefine Army doctrine, leading the charge with a concept that we’ve discussed before: mission command, the decentralization of decision-making to the lowest tactical level that can effectively achieve success for the commander’s mission, in line with the commander’s intent. More importantly, like the message of A Message to Garcia, junior leaders are empowered with the ability to make sound decisions within the commander’s guidance to support the commander’s end state.

The commander’s end state is pretty clear: don’t put a C-17 in the mud at the end of the runway at Shank airfield.

Just like the officers who paved the way before us, the Grants and Shermans of the world, we have an obligation to ourselves and our formations to learn by night the things that we may be required to teach and do by day.

So, forward I go to rewrite FM 3-04.120 into something usable for the warfighters. Hopefully it doesn’t just gather dust on a shelf in a tower facility somewhere when it’s all said and done.

Now, the question is, when this manual is ready for everyone to use and train with, who will help me carry a message to Garcia?