Doctrine doesn't fix everything.

Doctrine. It is the cause of, and solution to, all of my problems. I write good doctrine, I get praised and the terrorists lose. I write bad doctrine, and the terrorists win. My boss also does that silently-staring-because-I'm-disappointed-in-you thing. That’s actually worse than terrorists winning.

Often times we fall back to criticism of existing documents and doctrine as the reason for why things didn’t quite turn out as we expected. It’s as though we want doctrine to do for us what we refuse to do for ourselves: fill the gaps in knowledge that exist because... well... sometimes there is sh*t we just don't know. Pilots and aviation leaders want a comprehensive checklist solution to certain tactical problems that will be 99% effective in ensuring mission success, a placated ground force commander, joy, happiness, satisfied aircrews, puppies for all good little boys and girls, and a loaf in every oven. Doctrine just doesn’t work that way. It really doesn’t work that way for aviation.

Take manned- unmanned operations, for instance. The process of mixing unmanned aircraft and manned helicopters in reconnaissance tasks was a heavy topic on the list things to discuss at  the Aviation Synch Conference last week. The real gripes came from staff planners. Staffers rarely find the same level of joy in talking with other staffers that pilots find in talking to each other.  

And unfortunately, that’s the point at which air ground integration (AGI) tends to break down: the staff-to-staff communication.

So, if mission analysis and staff nug work is where AGI starts (in theory)… but it doesn’t (in reality)… then we should all simply give up now and start drinking.

I know. “But, Wings, it’s only noon and you’re flying this afternoon?” Spare me your AR 40-8 quotes, and save them for your APART. I’m an aviation doctrine writer. I have an escape clause in all Army Regulations.

In reality, the work load is double for aviators supporting ground forces in a COIN environment. Aviation is required to be familiar with their own impact on the ground force’s efforts in the local area of operations. In a COIN fight, we need to step up our game and be familiar with all aspects of the ground force commander’s intent. This is especially so for attack reconnaissance pilots. You have two masters, and you must ensure equal loyalty to both… no matter how much study and leg work you face. Lives and legitimacy depend upon it. It will take away from your time playing Call of Duty while waiting for a QRF launch. Bummer.

So, when the staff fails to truly integrate during mission analysis, it triples the work load of aircrews conducting air ground integration. You are, in a sense, picking up the slack for what your planners failed to provide. 

The majority of AGI breakdowns in planning occur at the brigade and battalion level. And, yet, there are tools a’plenty located at the BCT to facilitate this. The most crucial of these tools? The Brigade Aviation Element. Okay, I admit to being historically snarky against BAEs. On the other hand, some of the best people I know have worked in the element. These are guys who have actively pursued the advancement of aviation’s integration into the planning of all ground missions, especially the ones that would benefit from aerial fires. Not all forces get aviation support. Not all missions need an attack weapons team. Not all patrols get a pair of scouts. Not all named areas of interest get a Shadow loitering overhead. Not all cargo needs to be strapped to the floor of a Chinook. Aviation is not a panacea for every ill on the battlefield, but that should not stop the aviation staff from actively dialoguing with the ground planners. It should not stop the BAE from questioning whether a mission could be made stronger by the application of the right air resources at the right time.

When aviation allows itself to be marginalized at the staff and planning levels, it marginalizes its ability to project combat power. It willingly allows itself to remain as only an enabler, and then starts a self-deprecating cycle of both allowing itself to be shelved as merely “support” and then believing the hype about being shelved for “supporting roles only.” 

The questions every brigade S-3 should ask, whether ground or air, should be:

1. Have I allowed the BAE to become the least common denominator for my aviation planning? Did I bring the myth of “BAE as an extra AMR cell” on to myself? Did I train them? Did I allow them to train themselves? Have I fostered them enough to encourage open and honest review of aviation integration? Or am I using them as extra night battle captains?

2. Have I talked with my counterpart in the air or ground TOC today? Do I know what his commander’s intent is? Have I fostered AGI with my efforts today?

3. Would my TOC drink a couple beers with the other guy’s TOC? Do they think as one team? Or are they divided by the fundamental cry of “us versus them?”

Doctrine can’t solve all problems, but just about every problem a staff might encounter is in doctrine somewhere. It’s just not always Aviation Doctrine.

The trick is not knowing where to look, it’s knowing who to talk with... which typically starts with the staff and a manual that might not always be "aviation."